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Reexamining the Role of Illinois Brick in
Modern Antitrust Standing Analysis
Roger D. Blair*
Jeffrey L. Harrison**
Introduction
The Supreme Court's 1977 decision in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois' was
one of several opinions of that era that defined, and ultimately limited, the
scope of private enforcement of the antitrust laws.2 In Illinois Brick, the
Court held that indirect purchasers of goods and services from firms engaged
in price fixing may not pursue antitrust actions for damages against those
firms engaged in the price fixing.3
The Court's holding in Illinois Brick seemed to rest on three comple-
mentary rationales. First, suits by indirect purchasers would be too unwieldy
because each downstream purchaser would attempt to show the level of dam-
age it suffered as a result of a remote price-fixing scheme.4 Second, the Court
decided that deterrence, rather than compensation, was the primary purpose
of antitrust damages. Thus, they allowed direct purchasers to collect the full
amount of the overcharge, even if this exceeded the actual harm suffered by
that purchaser.5 Finally, because the Court already had barred the use of the
pass-on defense in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., the
Illinois Brick Court reasoned that it would have to either reverse Hanover
Shoe or prohibit the offensive use of the pass-on theory to avoid multiple
liability.6 It opted for the latter.7 Consequently, direct purchasers can collect
all overcharges even if those firms have passed a portion of the overcharge
on to indirect purchasers.8 Scholars roundly debated the issue of indirect
* Huber Hurst Professor of Economics, The University of Florida.
** Chesterfield Smith Professor of Law, The University of Florida. We would like to thank
the Warrington College of Business Administration and the College of Law at the University of
Florida for financial support. We also appreciate the research efforts of William Shilling and
David Cayse.
1 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
2 As a matter of substantive antitrust law, Continental TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
433 U.S. 36 (1977), is the best known case having this effect. Procedurally, private antitrust
enforcement has been tightened most notably by Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
3 See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 720. This description narrowly states the holding. Be-
cause the case actually involved price fixing, this statement is technically accurate, but it is prob-
ably also true that Illinois Brick bars recovery to any indirect plaintiff that seeks a measure of
damages equal to a price overcharge. For example, Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machin-
ery Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968), which prohibited a defense that plaintiffs had passed on a portion
of the overcharge that they were claiming as damages, was a monopolization case.
4 See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 745.
5 See id. at 746.
6 See id. at 736.
7 See id.
8 See id. at 735.
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purchaser "standing" 9 at the time of the Illinois Brick decision,10 but the
Court's position complemented its prior holding in Hanover Shoe, which pre-
cluded defendants from lowering damages by demonstrating that direct pur-
chasers had passed part of the overcharge on to their own customers."
Illinois Brick continues to require periodic interpretations by the Supreme
Court 12 and lower courts 3 to refine what is meant by an indirect purchaser
and to define possible exceptions.' 4
If viewed in the context of the simplest of price-fixing cases, and assum-
ing that antitrust law is solely a matter for federal regulation, Illinois Brick
makes good sense. To continue assessing Illinois Brick by reference to how it
works in the bare-bones price-fixing context, however, is too narrow a view.
First, the holding itself has not been confined to price-fixing cases.' 5 Second,
and more importantly, since Illinois Brick the Supreme Court has developed
a theory of antitrust standing which focuses on how remote a victim is rela-
tive to the anticompetitive action.' 6 A more fully developed notion of anti-
trust standing may render Illinois Brick expendable.' 7 Third, the Supreme
Court has ruled that states may enact statutes which allow indirect purchasers
to recover.' 8 As antitrust laws differ from state to state, the level of a defend-
ant's exposure may be a function of geography rather than the extent of the
competitive harm caused. Consequently, the level of deterrence varies just as
fortuitously. Finally, the characterization of a case through imaginative
pleading may enable a plaintiff to escape the limitation of Illinois Brick even
9 Although Illinois Brick is ultimately about "standing" in a general sense, the Supreme
Court, since that decision, has developed the concept of "antitrust standing." See infra text ac-
companying notes 136-153.
10 See, e.g., Robert G. Harris & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Passing On the Monopoly Over-
charge: A Comprehensive Policy Analysis, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 269 (1979); William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Passing On: A Reply to Harris and Sullivan, 128 U. PA. L,
REv. 1274 (1980); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Should Indirect Purchasers Have
Standing to Sue Under the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois Brick,
46 U. CHi. L. REv. 602 (1979).
11 See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 488 (1968).
12 See Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199,207 (1990); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,
442 U.S. 330, 331 (1979).
13 See, e.g., Lucas Automotive Eng'g, Inc. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 140 F.3d 1228,
1234 (9th Cir. 1998); Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166, 1169 (8th Cir. 1998); In re
Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144, 1164 (3d Cir. 1993); Jewish Hosp.
Ass'n v. Stewart Mechanical Enters., Inc., 628 F.2d 971, 973 (6th Cir. 1980).
14 See, e.g., Utilicorp, 497 U.S. at 207 (refusing to create an exception to the indirect pur-
chaser rule to enable a customer of a public utitlity to sue the utility's suppliers).
15 See, e.g., Campos, 140 F.3d at 1169 (applying the test for an alleged violation of section 4
of the Clayton Act).
16 See infra text accompanying notes 136-153.
17 Under a fully developed theory of antitrust standing, it may be possible that some indi-
rect purchasers would be entitled to damages while others would not.
18 See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 105-06 (1989) (holding that state indirect
purchaser statutes are not pre-empted by federal law). See generally Jay N. Fastow & David S.
Machlowitz, The Rise of the States on Antitrust Enforcement, 10 ACCA Docket 60 (1992); Re-
port, Report of the Indirect Purchaser Task Force, 63 ANrrrRusT L.J. 993 (1995); Report, Report
of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Task Force to Review the Supreme
Court's Decision in California v. ARC America Corp., 59 ANTITRusT L.J. 273 (1990).
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when it would appear to apply.19 Because of these factors, it has become
difficult to square Illinois Brick with a consistent and predictable scheme of
antitrust enforcement.
This Article argues that it is time for either the Court or Congress to
reexamine Illinois Brick for the purpose of reconciling it with more general
principles of antitrust standing. The overall goals of such an endeavor would
be to ensure consistent treatment of similarly situated potential plaintiffs and
to rationalize private antitrust enforcement. Section II briefly reviews the
history of Illinois Brick and Section III examines the relevant post-Illinois
Brick developments. This discussion suggests that Illinois Brick is a product
of antitrust happenstance and is sometimes applied inconsistently with its un-
derlying rationales or with modem antitrust standing theory. Section III also
recognizes that Illinois Brick's application can vary from circuit to circuit.
For example, in some circuits, Illinois Brick seems to be used to determine
the type of damage measure that can be employed; in other circuits, it seems
to be a more general standard for what kinds of plaintiffs may recover.20 Per-
haps more importantly, Illinois Brick, although intended to make antitrust
damage determination more manageable, actually forces plaintiffs into dam-
age proofs that are more complex than basic overcharge calculations.21
This examination sets the stage for Section IV, which analyzes a number
of possible solutions to problems surrounding Illinois Brick. One solution
would be to overturn both Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe, thereby leaving
the indirect purchaser issue to standard antitrust standing analysis. Over-
turning these two decisions may seem to raise some of the complexities that
Illinois Brick sought to avoid, but this Article suggests that these complexi-
ties have been overstated, at least relative to typical damage calculations.
Another solution would be to change the type of damages routinely granted
in price-fixing cases. Adopting lost profits as the appropriate measure of
damages for all plaintiffs would eliminate some of the problems Illinois Brick
sought to address. Finally, a more modest response would be to redefine the
limits of Illinois Brick in order to create greater consistency in the lower
courts. The objective of this approach would be to clarify whether Illinois
Brick determines the acceptable measure of damages in particular cases or
whether it determines the types of plaintiffs who may recover damages. Ad-
mittedly, none of these solutions is entirely satisfactory, but flexibility and the
consequent lack of predictability seem endemic to what is essentially "com-
mon law." Nevertheless, each of these proposals has the potential to increase
the consistency of private enforcement.
19 For example, price fixing could also be characterized as a boycott, thus escaping Illinois
Brick's limitation on price-fixing suits by indirect purchasers. See In re Brand Name Prescription
Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 606 (7th Cir. 1997).
20 See infra text accompanying notes 154-211.
21 See infra text accompanying notes 167-170.
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I. The Evolution of Illinois Brick
A. Early History
One can glean a greater understanding of Illinois Brick's awkward fit in
current antitrust law by examining the decision's genesis. The issues of who
and how much one may recover in an antitrust action arise from section 4 of
the Clayton Act, the pertinent parts of which provide that "[a]ny person who
shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in
the antitrust laws . . . shall recover threefold the damages by him sus-
tained."22 Of course, antitrust scholars now know that "any person" really
means "some persons" and that "damages ... sustained" is hardly subject to
concrete definition.
1. The "Reasonable Certainty" Standard
Part of the explanation for the rule of Illinois Brick can be traced to the
efforts by courts, soon after passage of the Sherman Act, to continue to apply
common law notions of when one was entitled to damages. One of the more
important rules for the recovery of damages was that the amount of damage
must be shown with "reasonable certainty." 23 An early example of this prop-
osition was Central Coal & Coke Co. v. Hartman,24 in which the plaintiff,
once a participant in a price-fixing "coal club" of coal wholesalers, withdrew
from the club only to find that the remaining members would not sell him
coal at any price other than the fixed price available to consumers.2- The
plaintiff could have claimed that he was the victim of a boycott or price fix-
ing. Additionally, in theory, damages could have been defined in terms of
lost profits or the overcharge. The Eighth Circuit rejected the plaintiff's
damage claim for lost profits and applied reasoning common in that era in
contract damages claims: "expected profits of a commercial business are too
remote, speculative, and uncertain to warrant a judgment for their loss." '26
The attitude courts took toward antitrust claims gradually changed.
Courts seemed to be swayed by the notion that a rigid approach to damages
permitted "wrong-doers" to escape the consequences of their actions. Per-
haps the best early example of this was Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern
Photo Materials Co.27 The plaintiff, Southern Photo, purchased photographic
22 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1994).
23 See Central Coal & Coke Co. v. Hartman, 111 F. 96, 98 (8th Cir. 1901).
24 Id. at 96.
25 See id. at 97. The plaintiff could have described the conduct of the defendants as either
price fixing or a group boycott-or both. Although not an indirect purchaser, if the plaintiff had
been, these options might have created an avenue for avoiding Illinois Brick. See infra text
accompanying notes 122-125.
26 Central Coal, 111 F. at 98. Although cited as an example of the difficulties of recovering
lost profits, it is not clear that the plaintiff presented enough evidence to survive even a less
exacting standard.
27 273 U.S. 359, 379 (1927). Five years earlier in Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Rail-
way Co., 260 U.S. 156 (1922), the Supreme Court also considered the standard to be applied in a
lost profits case involving antitrust laws and reasoned that recovery could be allowed if damages
were based on "facts from which their existence is logically and legally inferable." Keogh, 260
U.S. at 158.
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supplies from Kodak and sold them to consumers. 8 Southern Photo claimed
that Kodak had violated antitrust laws by acquiring Southern Photo's com-
petitors and refusing to make photographic supplies available to Southern
Photo at prices reflecting a dealer's discount.29 Instead, Kodak charged
Southern Photo the same prices it charged in its retail stores.30
The damage claim was for the profits lost due to Southern Photo's in-
ability to buy Kodak's products at the discounted prices.31 In calculating
damages, the plaintiff relied on a four-year period before the violation to
estimate its lost sales and then subtracted its operating costs from the gross
revenue it would have earned. 32 The defendant, citing Hartman for the prop-
osition that proof of loss must be shown with reasonable certainty, argued
that the damages were "purely speculative. '33 The Supreme Court agreed
with the Fifth Circuit that "'[d]amages are not rendered uncertain because
they cannot be calculated with absolute exactness. It is sufficient if a reason-
able basis of computation is afforded, although the result be only approxi-
mate."' 34 The rationale for this approach was that "a defendant whose
wrongful conduct has rendered difficult the ascertainment of the precise
damages suffered ... is not entitled to complain that they cannot be mea-
sured with the same exactness and precision as would otherwise be possi-
ble.''as This, of course, makes sense because the wrongdoer has created the
need for estimation and the resulting uncertainty.
A more liberal view is found in 1946 in Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures,
Inc.,36 in which exhibitors of motion pictures claimed that a conspiracy
among other exhibitors and distributors denied them access to films. The
plaintiffs calculated damages based on lost profits caused by their competi-
tive disadvantage relative to other theaters that had access to the films.37 The
plaintiffs used two methods to calculate damages; one involved a comparison
of their profits with those of a competing theater involved in the conspiracy,
and the other compared their profits before the conspiracy with profits after
the conspiracy.38 In neither case did the plaintiffs account for any of the fac-
28 See Eastman Kodak Co., 273 U.S. at 368.
29 See id. at 368-69.
30 See id. at 369.
31 See id.
32 See id. at 376.
33 See ic at 376-78. For a modem analysis of speculative damages, see Roger D. Blair &
William H. Page, "Speculative" Antitrust Damages, 70 WASH. L. Rnv. 423 (1995).
34 See Eastman Kodak Co., 273 U.S. at 379 (quoting Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern
Photo Materials Co., 295 F. 98, 102 (5th Cir. 1923), affd, 273 U.S. 359 (1927)).
35 Id. For this proposition, the Court cites Hetzel v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 169 U.S.
26, 39 (1898). Whether that case stands for the proposition attributed to it by the Southern
Photo Court is not obvious. The Southern Photo Court describes the problem of permitting the
wrong-doer to escape when he or she has rendered the determination of damages more difficult.
Hetzel, on the other hand, suggests merely that "it does not come with very good grace [for a
wrongdoer] to insist upon the most specific and certain proof .... ." Hetzel, 169 U.S. at 38-39.
36 327 U.S. 251 (1946); see also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S.
100, 123 (1969) (holding that the fact finder may award treble damages based on a reasonable
inference).
37 See Bigelow, 327 U.S. at 257-58.
38 See id The yardstick and "before and after" methodologies remain mainstays of anti-
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tors that could have affected profits other than the discriminatory treat-
ment.39 The Supreme Court, nonetheless, ruled that although a verdict may
not be based on mere speculation, a jury may make a "just and reasonable
estimate. '40
2. Acceptance of the Overcharge as the Proper Measure of Damages
Although adherence to the common law requirement of "reasonable
certainty" was relaxed, another equally important development also made it
easier for some antitrust plaintiffs to recover. This development was the ac-
ceptance of the overcharge as the standard measure of damages in price-
fixing cases. The overcharge equals the difference between the price paid
and the price that would have prevailed "but for" the violation. The
Supreme Court apparently first accepted and applied the overcharge mea-
sure of damages in Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta.41
In this 1906 case, the City of Atlanta purchased cast iron water pipe for its
municipal waterworks from a seller engaged in price fixing.42 The "damages"
could hardly be expressed in terms of lost profits because a municipal water-
works does not earn profits. The Court permitted recovery for "the differ-
ence between the price paid and the market or fair price" 43 of the pipe, that
is, the difference between the price paid and the price in the absence of the
conspiracy. Accordingly, "[the city] was injured in its property, at least, if not
in its business of furnishing water, by being led to pay more than the worth of
the pipe."44
The illegal overcharge measure of damages was clearly the appropriate
measure of damages in Chattanooga Foundry. In a not-for-profit undertak-
ing, the cost of providing the service above the cost at which it could have
been provided is the actual loss to the provider. In other contexts, however,
the overcharge measure does not match up with any conventional measure of
damages.45 The actual harm suffered by the buyer is the profit lost as a result
of the overcharge. 46 It is this amount-not the overcharge-that accurately
trust damage calculation. See Roger D. Blair & Amanda Kay Esquibel, Yardstick Damages in
Lost Profit Cases: An Econometric Approach, 72 DNv. U. L. Rnv. 113 (1994); Jeffrey L. Harri-
son, The Lost "Profits" Measure of Damages in Price Enhancement Cases, 64 MiNN. L. Rnv. 751,
779-80 (1980).
39 These factors would include differences in competition, differences in the costs of opera-
tion, changes in demand, changes in business conditions, and other determinants of financial
success.
40 Bigelow, 327 U.S. at 264.
41 203 U.S. 390 (1906).
42 See id. at 391.
43 Id. at 396.
44 Id.
45 This is discussed more fully in footnote 48 and Section IV.B., infra.
46 A party paying a higher price for an input or a good has, in theory, three options. First,
it can maintain the same resale price. If so, the party will experience a decreased profit on each
unit sold. If the party chooses to continue to sell the same quantity, the lost profit and over-
charge are the same, but this is an unlikely strategy. Second, the party can attempt to pass the
full price increase on to its customers. As prices rise, customers will demand fewer units, and the
profit that was made on those units will be lost. Third, if the party is a seller it can, and typically
does, raise the price, but not by the full amount of the overcharge. The seller, therefore, loses
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compensates the buyer.47 Moreover, the overcharge is not even equal to the
unjust enrichment of the price fixers.48
Consequently, following Chattanooga Foundry, courts could have re-
stricted the overcharge measure to cases in which plaintiffs were not attempt-
ing to earn a profit and required all other plaintiffs to seek actual
compensatory damages. This did not occur and both for-profit and not-for-
profit price-fixing victims alike sought the overcharge measure of damages.
The availability of this measure of damages was heightened, in part, because
of a line of cases decided during the same period concerning the rates
charged by railroads in excess of what the Interstate Commerce Commission
deemed reasonable. In the leading case, Southern Pacific Co. v. Darnell-
Taenzer Lumber Co.,49 shippers asked for reparations equal to the over-
charge while the defendant railroads argued that the shippers had passed the
overcharge on to their customers.50 In rejecting this form of the "pass on"
defense, Justice Holmes stated that "[t]he general tendency of the law, in
regard to damages at least, is not to go beyond the first step.''51 The reason-
ing, he suggested, was that the legal claim accrued at the time the overcharge
occurred and that the law "does not inquire into later events.
52
Not only was the overcharge measure available to for-profit and not-for-
profit plaintiffs, it also was not limited to conventional price-fixing cases. Es-
pecially in the period between Chattanooga Foundry and Southern Photo, it
was beneficial for any plaintiff to express its damages in terms of an over-
charge. For example, Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co.,53 a 1924 case,
seems to fit the fact pattern of what would be viewed, in modern times, as a
"terminated dealer" case.54 Macy's, a dealer in Victor's original distribution
system, purchased Victor products and resold them to the public.55 Victor
decided to convert its former dealers into sales agents. Under this arrange-
ment, the former dealers did not actually purchase and resell Victor prod-
some profit on the units it continues to sell, and it also loses profits on sales lost as a result of the
price increase.
47 It is worthwhile to note that this analysis presupposes the typical model of price fixing
by sellers. Price fixing by buyers is also commonplace-for example, bid rigging at auctions-in
which case, the measure would be in terms of an "undercharge." For a detailed analysis of mo-
nopsony, see ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPsONY: ANTITRUST LAW AND
ECONOMICS (1994).
48 The overcharge to the victim is equal to the quantity purchased multiplied by the differ-
ence between the price paid and the price that would have been paid in the absence of the price
fixing. This is not equal to the net benefit to the price-fixing firms. Basic economic theory
indicates that an increase in price will result in fewer units being sold. Thus, although the price-
fixing firms receive the overcharge, it is offset to some degree by the loss in revenue from sales
forgone.
49 245 U.S. 531 (1918).
50 See id. at 533.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 534. Precisely where the duty to mitigate damages would fall into this formulation
is not clear. See Amanda Kay Esquibel, The Rule of Avoidable Consequences in Antitrust Cases:
A Law and Economics Approach, 26 HoFsTRA L. Rsv. 891, 911 (1998).
53 297 F. 791 (2d Cir. 1924).
54 See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND
IS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 222-30 (3d ed. 1998).
55 Macy's bought and sold primarily phonograph records.
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ucts.5 6 Because Macy's refused to enter into the new arrangement, Victor
refused to provide additional products.57 Macy's remained in the retail mar-
ket by obtaining Victor products through other sources, although not at the
discounted price it would have enjoyed had it not been terminated as a
dealer.58 The Second Circuit noted that "[t]he constant tendency of the
courts is to find some way in which damages can be awarded where a wrong
has been done. '59 The court further noted that, historically, plaintiffs claim-
ing damages equal to lost profits frequently failed to recover because they
could not meet the "reasonable certainty" requirement. 60 In Straus, the
plaintiff attempted to avoid that problem by asking for damages equal to the
difference between the price it had paid for the products after termination,
and the price it would have paid had it not been terminated.61 In permitting
what was, in effect, an overcharge theory, the court essentially accepted a
justification based on proximate cause. As in Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co.,62
from which the Court quoted, the notion seemed to be that the harm initially
suffered by the plaintiff was the increase in price. 63 Thus, according to the
Second Circuit, plaintiffs "contend ... for a rule of damage which seeks the
proximate cause of damage and the proximate result occasioned by that
cause." 64
By the 1940s, efforts to reconcile the antitrust damage provisions with
the common law requirement that lost profits be proven with "reasonable
certainty" led to two outcomes: (1) the routine measure of damages in price-
fixing cases was the overcharge; and (2) the standard of certainty for the
amount of damages in all antitrust cases was relaxed.65 It is noteworthy that
only the second step was necessary for the antitrust laws to overcome the
"reasonable certainty" hurdle of the common law. Having taken that step,
courts could have required all plaintiffs to estimate actual damages as re-
flected in reduced profits. In one line of cases-those dealing with price dis-"
crimination-this adjustment has occurred. 66 Otherwise, both of these
accommodations to the problem of proving damages continue to exist.
Therefore, depending on the alleged violation, a plaintiff may recover either
actual losses or an amount that is likely to be greatly in excess of actual
losses. This creates an obvious imbalance in the incentives to bring private
actions.
56 See Straus, 297 F. at 794. The purpose of the change was to enable Victor to control the
resale price of its products. This was a result of Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons,
220 U.S. 373 (1911), which held that fixing minimum resale prices was unlawful.
57 See Straus, 297 F. at 795.
58 See id. at 800-01.
59 Id. at 802.
60 See id.
61 See id. at 803.
62 Southern Pac. Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531 (1918).
63 See Straus, 297 F. at 803.
64 Id. The court quoted Justice Holmes for the proposition that "'[t]he general tendency
of the law, in regard to damages at least, is not to go beyond the first step."' Id. (quoting
Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. at 533).
65 See Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251,264 (1946); Story Parchment Co.
v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562 (1931).
66 See J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557 (1981).
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B. Illinois Brick
The developments designed to ensure that victims of anticompetitive be-
havior did not go uncompensated have actually limited the extent to which
some of those harmed can recover. This outcome can be traced directly to
the use of the overcharge measure of damages, and the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.67 Hanover Shoe
was a private action in the aftermath of the well-known U.S. Justice Depart-
ment action challenging United Shoe's practice of making its shoe manufac-
turing machinery available on a lease-only basis.68 Rather than asking for
damages equal to lost profits, Hanover Shoe framed its damage claim in
terms of an illegal overcharge. 69 The trial court reasoned that Hanover Shoe
would have purchased the machines, if permitted to do so, at a lower cost
than the cost of the leases.7 ° United Shoe challenged this measure of dam-
ages by arguing that Hanover Shoe had passed the overcharge on to its own
customers and, thus, suffered no injury.71 The Court rejected this so-called
"pass-on" defense.7 2 First, the Court reasoned that recognizing such a de-
fense would render antitrust cases far more complicated.73 Second, the Court
feared that those who ultimately absorbed the overcharge-the consumers-
would have so little at stake in the outcome of an antitrust action that a
violation might go unchallenged.7 4
67 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
68 See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 297 (D. Mass. 1953),
affd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). See generally SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 54, at
290-91. For a critical analysis of the Court's reasoning, see John Shepard Wiley, Jr. et al., The
Leasing Monopolist, 37 UCLA L. REv. 693 (1990), and Scott E. Masten & Edward A. Snyder,
United States versus United Shoe Machinery Corporation: On the Merits, 36 J.L. & EcoN. 33
(1993). For a supportive analysis, consult Joseph F. Brodley & Ching-to Albert Ma, Contract
Penalties, Monopolizing Strategies, and Antitrust Policy, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1161 (1993).
69 See Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 483-84.
70 See id. at 487.
71 See id. at 487-88.
72 See id. at 488. The Court did carve out an exception for instances in which the
overcharged buyer resold under a preexisting cost-plus contract. See id. at 494; see also Herbert
Hovenkamp, The Indirect-Purchaser Rule and Cost-Plus Sales, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1717 (1990).
A further exception is suggested in Illinois Brick for instances in which "the direct purchaser is
owned or controlled by its customer." Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720,736 n.16 (1977).
73 See Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 493.
74 See id. at 494. Interestingly, it is not entirely clear that the Hanover Shoe Court under-
stood the difference between the overcharge measure of damages and lost profits. For example,
at one point Justice White, for the Court, reasons that
[i]f in the face of the overcharge the buyer does nothing and absorbs the loss, he is
entitled to treble damages .... The reason is that he has paid more than he should
and his property has been illegally diminished, for had the price paid been lower his
profits would have been higher.
Id. at 489. Similarly, "[a]s long as the seller continues to charge the illegal price, he takes from
the buyer more than the law allows. At whatever price the buyer sells, the price he pays the
seller remains illegally high, and his profits would be greater were his costs lower." Id. Perhaps
the reasoning of the Court was that even if the buyer passes on the overcharge, there will be a
lower profit. As a matter of economic theory, that is almost always the case. Furthermore, if
profits are lower, the damage requirement of section 4 is arguably fulfilled. The measure of
damages, however, is the overcharge. The problem with this analysis is that section 4 specifically
calls for "threefold the damages ... sustained." 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
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Illinois Brick addressed an issue complementary to that addressed in
Hanover Shoe. As in Chattanooga Foundry, Illinois Brick involved purchases
by a governmental entity.75 In this case, the State of Illinois claimed that it
had made purchases from contractors who were customers of price-fixing
manufacturers of concrete blocks.76 The issue was whether these "indirect
purchasers" could collect damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act.77
Although the plaintiffs urged the Court to limit Hanover Shoe to cases in
which capital goods were the price-fixed goods, the Court adopted the view
that ruling in favor of indirect purchasers would require overruling Hanover
Shoe.78 The Court reasoned that permitting the offensive use of a pass-on
theory while not permitting a pass-on defense would subject defendants to
multiple liability.7 9 In addition, the basic rationale-the complexity of sort-
ing out the incidence of the overcharge-was no less compelling in the con-
text of indirect purchasers. 80
Having decided that the pass-on theory would have to apply equally to
both plaintiffs and defendants, the Court held that there could be no offen-
sive use of the theory.8' In so doing, the Court reasoned that "the use of the
pass-on theories" would result in "massive efforts to apportion the recovery
among all potential plaintiffs that could have absorbed part of the overcharge
.... ,,82 These complications would follow from efforts to determine the ex-
tent of the damage at each level of the chain of distribution.83 The complex-
ity would not be overcome by the possibility that all potential plaintiffs could
be joined. In rejecting the practicality of apportioning a fixed amount of
overcharge, the Court accepted the notion that, in theory, portions of the
overcharge could be assigned to each level in the chain of distribution by
knowing the elasticity of demand and supply at each level.84 But, to the
Court, the theory did not translate into sound antitrust policy.85
Related to the apportionment problem was the Court's view that, under
a pass-on system, each plaintiff would incur greater costs in proving damages
75 See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 726.
76 See id. at 726-27.
77 See id. At the time, there was a division among the circuit courts on this issue. Com-
pare Mangano v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971),
with In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973).
78 See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 736.
79 See id. at 730.
80 See id. at 731-33.
81 See id. at 735. In a fashion similar to that in Hanover Shoe, the Court recognized the
cost-plus exception to the rule. See id. at 736. In addition, it recognized that the exception
"might" apply when "the direct purchaser is owned or controlled by its customer." Id. at 736
n.16. For a thorough discussion of the "control exception," see Dee-K Enterprises, Inc. v.
Heveafil Sdn. Bhd., 982 F. Supp. 1138, 1152-53 (E.D. Va. 1997). See also In re Wyoming Tight
Sands Antitrust Cases, 866 F.2d 1286, 1293 (10th Cir. 1989).
82 Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 737.
83 See id. The Court conceded that use of the theory by both defendants and plaintiffs
would reduce the likelihood of multiple liability assuming that inconsistent judgments were not
made. See it. at 737 n.18.
84 See id. at 741.
85 See id. at 743-45.
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and the net recovery for direct and indirect purchasers would decline.86 This
would "seriously impair this important weapon of antitrust enforcement." 87
The Court recognized that rejection of the pass-on theory would mean that
indirect victims of anticompetitive acts would go uncompensated. 88 It also
noted the likelihood that some direct purchasers would decline to bring an
action against suppliers to avoid risking a disruption in their relationship with
those suppliers.89 Still, in balancing the costs and benefits of permitting use
of pass-on arguments, the Court found greater deterrence to be a more im-
portant goal than more accurate compensation.90
It is useful to focus on several important aspects of Illinois Brick. For
one thing, the decision accepts in a very broad sense the imprecision of the
gross overcharge measure of damages. It is imprecise not simply because
some portion of the overcharge is passed on, but because the overcharge al-
ways has been regarded as a measure of the defendant's gain as opposed to
the plaintiff's loss (or damage). 91 In addition, there is very little to suggest
that the rationale of Illinois Brick is to be extended beyond cases involving
damages calculated as overcharges. This is important because the general
notion that the proof of damages is complex is accurate in a great many in-
stances and Illinois Brick left open the issue whether the complexity rationale
might be extended to define a more general concept of antitrust standing.
II. Post-Illinois Brick Developments
Almost immediately after Illinois Brick, events began to unfold that
seemed to undo whatever rationalizing effect the decision had. One of these
events was the Supreme Court's approval of indirect purchaser actions under
state antitrust laws. 92 Another was an extremely broad interpretation of Illi-
nois Brick and a narrow interpretation of its exceptions. 93 The most impor-
tant event has been the development of a comprehensive approach to
antitrust standing.94 Finally, a number of lower court opinions have inter-
preted Illinois Brick in inconsistent ways.95
A. State Indirect Purchaser Actions
One of the most significant events, and one having a severe derationaliz-
ing effect on antitrust enforcement, occurred in 1989 when several states
brought actions similar to that in Illinois Brick. In California v. ARC
America Corp.,96 the plaintiffs-state governments-were indirect purchas-
86 See id. at 744-45.
87 Id. at 745.
88 See id. at 746.
89 See id.
90 See id. at 746-47.
91 As explained in note 48, supra, the overcharge may overstate the actual gain to the
defendant.
92 See infra Part III.A.
93 See infra Part ILI.B.
94 See infra Part III.C.
95 See infra Part III.D.
96 490 U.S. 93 (1989). For an interesting analysis of ARC America's implications, see Ron-
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ers of cement.97 Their actions were filed not only under federal antitrust law,
but under state antitrust laws that permitted indirect purchasers to recover.98
The issue before the Court was whether its decisions in Hanover Shoe and
Illinois Brick preempted state laws permitting indirect purchasers to
recover.99
In an awkwardly reasoned opinion, the Court set out basic preemption
doctrine, indicating that preemption could occur in this type of case100 only if
Congress intended to occupy the field or, in instances in which Congress has
not occupied the field, if the state law "actually conflicts with federal law." 101
At its most basic level, the case for preemption came down to whether al-
lowing indirect purchasers to recover under state law would undermine the
policies underlying Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick. The Court considered
three policies. The first "policy" was one of avoiding complicated proce-
dures. 102 The Court noted that recognition of indirect purchasers would not
necessarily complicate matters in federal courts.1°3 Not only were state anti-
trust issues likely to be addressed by state courts, but if a federal court were
asked to consider the state claim under pendant jurisdiction, the court could
decline.' 04
The second "policy" was not diluting the incentives of potential plain-
tiffs.' 05 On this issue, the Court reasoned that there would be no decreased
incentive for direct purchasers to bring actions under federal antitrust laws.106
The third and most difficult "policy" of Illinois Brick that the Court ad-
dressed was the avoidance of multiple liability.107 The Court's reasoning on
this point is far from convincing. In a conclusory fashion, it simply explained
that in "none of [the previous direct purchaser and standing cases] did the
Court identify a federal policy against States imposing liability in addition to
that imposed by federal law."' 08 This reasoning actually may be consistent
with preemption doctrine, but it is inconsistent with a fair reading of the
aid W. Davis, Indirect Purchaser Litigation: ARC America's Chickens Come Home to Roost on
the Illinois Brick Wall, 65 ANrrrriusr LJ. 375, 394-406 (1997).
97 See ARC Am., 490 U.S. at 97-98.
98 See id. at 98.
99 See id. at 100. The actual litigation was precipitated by a dispute over whether the
states, as indirect purchasers, had a right to part of a settlement fund. But the district court and
the Ninth Circuit held that indirect purchaser plaintiffs, under Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick,
did not have a right to a share of the funds. See In re Cement & Concrete Antitrust Litig., 817
F.2d 1435, 1445 (1987).
100 This was a case in which there was no express preemption by Congress. See ARC Am.,
440 U.S. at 100-01.
101 Id. at 100. In this instance, the issue concerned an area traditionally left to state regula-
tion, and therefore, according to the Court, those arguing for preemption would be required to
overcome the presumption against preemption. See id. at 101.
102 See id. at 103.
103 See id.
104 See id.
105 See id. at 104.
106 See id. The Court also rejected an argument that the presence of indirect purchasers
would mean that direct purchasers would be offered less in settlements and, therefore, were less
likely to bring actions. See id. at 105.
107 See id. at 105.
108 Id. at 105.
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base-line policy underlying Illinois Brick, in which the Court concluded that
offensive use of the pass-on theory without defensive use would result in "du-
plicative recoveries" and "unwarranted multiple liability."'10 9
The importance of ARC America can best be understood by focusing on
the possibility that there may be an efficient level of anticompetitive activity
as well as an efficient level of enforcement. Although the notion of an effi-
cient level of anticompetitive activity may seem rather odd, it is important to
remember that the line separating antitrust violations from lawful activities
often is not a bright one. Thus, a firm engaging in conduct that has not been
adjudicated under antitrust law risks exposure to treble damages. Moreover,
the activity itself may not be the key source of uncertainty. Many arguably
anticompetitive actions, whether assessed under section 1 or 2 of the Sher-
man Act, will not violate antitrust laws unless the firm possesses market
power." 0 The concept of market power, however, can be slippery. Notwith-
standing the judicial tradition of inferring market power from market share,
market power is only partially related to the firm's market share.' Not only
is the requisite level of market power difficult to determine in an absolute
sense, it may be that the level of market power needed to establish an anti-
trust violation differs with the activity involved."? Even this understates the
risk. When a business practice or market structure is actually litigated, the
question of market power becomes an issue for a relatively unsophisticated.
jury to decide.
All of these factors may make it seem futile to discuss seriously the "effi-
cient" level of enforcement and the "efficient" level of risky and, possibly,
illegal behavior. Regardless of how one feels about the practicality of having
useful debates on these matters before ARC America, the decision to permit
plaintiffs to press indirect purchaser actions under state law means that a firm
is, for all practical purposes, simply unable to determine the expected cost of
taking any action that falls in the gray areas of antitrust." 3
109 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 730 (1977). This is not to say that the threat of
multiple liability was ever all that great or that the Court's position on it in Hanover Shoe and
Illinois Brick was well-founded.
110 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94
HARv. L. REv. 937 (1981).
111 For a discussion of the determinants of market power, see Landes & Posner, supra note
110.
112 The best example of this is "attempt to monopolize" under section 2 of the Sherman
Act. To be guilty of an attempt, the firm must pose a dangerous probability of becoming an
actual monopoly. Dangerous probability will often be related to market share, but the market
share that is consistent with the creation of a dangerous probability may change with the aggres-
siveness of the defendant's actions. See SULLrvAN & HARRISON, supra note 54, at 318-22.
113 According to a 1990 study, fourteen states and the District of Columbia have enacted
indirect purchaser legislation. See ARC American Task Force, Report of the American Bar As-
sociation Section of Antitrust Law Task Force to Review the Supreme Court's Decision in Califor-
nia v. ARC America Corp., 59 ANrrrrRuST L.J. 273, 278 (1990). For a discussion in the context
of class actions, see William H. Page, The Limits of Indirect Purchaser Suits: Class Certification
in the Shadow of Illinois Brick, 67 ANrrTRusT L.J. 1 (1999).
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B. Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Inc.11 4
In Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick, the Supreme Court left open two
possible ways for indirect purchasers to recover. The first is when the indi-
rect purchaser has a preexisting cost-plus contract with the direct pur-
chaser.115 The second possibility arises when the direct purchaser is owned
or controlled by the firm fixing prices.116 Together, these exceptions suggest
that indirect purchasers would have federal standing when the difficulties of
apportioning the overcharge among groups would be minimal and when the
direct purchaser has little motivation to bring an action.
The Court's 1990 decision in Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Inc. all but ex-
tinguished the possibility of a policy-based determination of other exceptions
to Illinois Brick. In that case, the indirect purchasers were residents of Kan-
sas and Missouri" 7 who claimed that they had purchased natural gas from
various utilities at inflated prices." 8 The prices were inflated, the indirect
purchaser insisted, because a pipeline and a group of gas production compa-
nies were fixing prices. 119 The direct purchaser was the utility serving cus-
tomers in Kansas and Missouri.120 The defendants claimed the utility lacked
standing because it passed the entire overcharge on to consumers under the
rates filed with the relevant regulatory agencies. 121 The District Court held
that the utilities had standing while the consumers did not.122
In a five-to-four opinion,' 23 the Court affirmed the lower court. In so
doing, the Court responded to the argument that the utilities had what was,
in effect, a cost-plus contract with the consumers in which the overcharges
114 497 U.S. 199 (1990). For additional reading on the use of indirect purchasers, see
Robert Elkin & Robert J. Bluhm, Indirect Purchaser Standing in Antitrust Actions: Duplicative
Liability in the Energy Industry, 11 ENERGY L.J. 185 (1990); Louise Weinberg, The Federal-State
Conflict of Laws: 'Actual' Conflicts, 70 TEX. L. REv. 1743 (1992); and Lee J. Potter, Case Note,
Kansas and Missouri v. Utilicorp United Inc.: The Supreme Court Applies the Illinois Brick Rule
to Regulated Utilities, 69 N.C. L. Rtv. 1041 (1991).
115 See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 732 n.12 (1977). The reason for such an
exception is clear: the overcharge is fully passed on to the indirect purchaser under the terms of
the contract. There would be no apportioning problem and no danger of duplicative recovery.
See also Jean W. Bums, The Paradox of Antitrust and Lanham Act Standing, 42 UCLA L. Rav.
47, 63 (1994); Michael S. Jacobs, Lessons From the Pharmaceutical Antitrust Litigation: Indirect
Purchasers, Antitrust Standing, and Antitrust Federalism, 42 ST. Louis U. L.J. 59, 66 (1998).
116 See Jacobs, supra note 115, at 69-70; James S. Helfrich, Note, Limiting a Regulated Pass-
On Exception to Illinois Brick, 62 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 647, 649 (1988). The control exception
makes sense because the direct purchaser is not independent and, therefore, not likely to pursue
any antitrust remedy.
117 The suit was brought by the States of Kansas and Missouri as parens patriae. See
Utilicorp, 497 U.S. at 204.
118 See id.
119 See id. at 207.
120 See id. at 205.
121 See id.
122 See id.
123 See id. at 206. The Court granted certiorari in order to resolve a dispute on the issue of
indirect purchaser standing between the Tenth Circuit, from which this case arose, see In re
Wyoming Tight Sands Antitrust Cases, 866 F.2d 1286 (10th Cir. 1989), and the Seventh Circuit,
see Illinois ex rel Hartigan v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 852 F.2d. 891 (7th Cir. 1988) (en
banc). See Utilicorp, 497 U.S. at 206.
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appeared as part of the rate filed with the state regulatory agencies.124 The
states conceded that even a fully passed-through overcharge would result in
some damage to the utility as consumers decreased purchases in response to
higher prices.125 Nevertheless, the states argued that the full overcharge on
the quantity sold was passed on to the consumers and the apportionment
problem, which Illinois Brick sought to avoid, did not exist. 26 In response,
the majority of the Court noted that the utility could be injured in ways other
than a loss of business. 27 Specifically, to determine whether the direct pur-
chaser-the utility-suffered any damage, one would have to know whether
that purchaser could have raised prices.' 28 If a direct purchaser could have,
and then does, raise prices in response to a cost increase associated with price
fixing, then the price fixing harms the direct purchaser by inhibiting its ability
to raise prices for its own benefit.129 The Court also noted that a cost in-
crease might not result in an instant increase in consumer prices, which also
would complicate the apportionment problem. 130 In effect, the apportion-
ment process in a regulated context was unlikely to be any less complicated
than in an unregulated context.
The Court also noted that any recovery granted to the utility may have
to be passed on to consumers. 13' This, according to the Court, meant that the
indirect purchasers may be compensated independent of their own action for
damages. 32
The Court then attempted to address a problem that its own analysis
seemed to create: If utilities were likely to be required to pass on to consum-
ers any antitrust recovery, what incentive would the utility have to bring an
action in the first place? The Court reasoned that the utility would have to
be aggressive about pressing its claim because it could not be sure that it
could pass the overcharge on to its customers.133 Moreover, the Court noted
that utilities historically had been aggressive in the enforcement of antitrust
laws.13 4
It is much easier to see Utilicorp as driven by policy as opposed to reason
or even straight-forward precedent. The type of apportionment the Court
124 See Utilicorp, 497 U.S. at 217.
125 See id. at 209.
126 See id. at 208.
127 See id. at 209.
128 See id.
129 See id.
130 See id. at 210.
131 See id. at 212.
132 See id. at 211-12. This raises a rather obvious question: Why would the utility bother
suing if it could not retain any of the award?
133 See id. at 214. This is somewhat curious reasoning because the overcharge already had
been passed on to the consumers.
134 See id. at 215. The dissenting opinion, written by Justice White, took issue with virtually
every aspect of the majority's reasoning. For example, Justice White wrote that it seemed "fanci-
ful" to think the utility was not charging rates as high as the state would allow. Id. at 222 (White,
J., dissenting). Therefore, the rate increase could be traced directly and fully to the overcharge.
See id. (White, J., dissenting). The dissent also noted that the "difficult" apportioning problem
identified by the majority was a common exercise in other types of antitrust actions. See id. at
223 (White, J., dissenting).
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seemed to fear is certainly less complicated than that found in many private
actions for damages. In addition, the notion that the utility charges less than
regulatory officials would allow seems less likely than the opposite assump-
tion. The general impression the opinion leaves is not that the Court has
engaged in successful reasoning, but that it has set out a number of assump-
tions under which its holding could be reconciled with Hanover Shoe and
Illinois Brick.135 Thus, what Utilicorp seems to stand for most clearly is a
narrowing of the scope of antitrust plaintiffs and a broad disfavoring of ac-
tions by those who are arguably "indirectly" affected.
C. Supreme Court Development of Antitrust Standing
Soon after its decision in Illinois Brick, the Court decided a series of
cases that addressed issues raised in its wake. In its decisions in Blue Shield
v. McCready136 in 1982, and Associated General Contractors, Inc. v. Califor-
nia State Council, Inc 37 ("AGC") a year later, the Supreme Court began to
articulate the basic elements of "antitrust standing. '138 More specifically, the
Court addressed the issue of how to properly interpret the language of sec-
tion 4 of the Clayton Act, which permits recovery by "any person who shall
be injured. ' 139 The Court described this as an inquiry that was "analytically
distinct"'140 from that presented in Illinois Brick.141
In AGC, the more important of these two cases, 142 the Court developed
a multipart test. First, the plaintiff must have suffered antitrust injury. 143
Second, a court must weigh three factors including the remoteness of the
injury,144 the existence of a potential plaintiff with a greater motivation to
135 In this respect, it reminds one of the "rational relationship" test found in equal protec-
tion analysis.
136 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
137 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
138 The Court previously had addressed the issue in a more general context in Association
of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), and concluded that
a plaintiff had standing if there was injury in fact and the interest to be protected is "arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guaran-
tee in question." Camp, 397 U.S. at 153. For a good survey of antitrust standing decisions prior
to 1980, see Comment, Standing to Sue in Antitrust Cases: The Offensive Use of Passing-On, 123
U. PA. L. REv. 976 (1975).
139 McCready, 457 U.S. at 472.
140 Id. at 476.
141 This was, in fact, a question that had been addressed by lower courts for years.
142 The facts of McCready are found in the text accompanying notes 248-249, infra.
143 See Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council, Inc., 459 U.S. 519, 540
(1983). In a separate but related line of cases, the Court had developed the notion of "antitrust
injury." In effect, the injured party must complain of the type of injury that the antitrust laws
were designed to protect against. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S.
477, 489 (1977). See generally Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Rethinking Antitrust Injury,
42 VAND. L. REv. 1539 (1989); Page, supra note 113.
144 See Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council, Inc., 459 U.S. at 540.
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bring an action,145 and the complexity of the ensuing litigation should a par-
ticular plaintiff be permitted to bring an action.146
Although Illinois Brick is viewed as analytically distinct from the AGC
test and is expressly invoked to support only the last of these three factors, it
is hard not to see the policies of Illinois Brick throughout AGC.147 For exam-
ple, Illinois Brick stressed not just the complexity issue, but also the problem
of deterrence. 14 Indeed, the closeness of the opinions might best be assessed
by asking what the analysis in Illinois Brick might have looked like had it
been issued after AGC's more general standing guidelines had been estab-
lished. Almost certainly, the Court would have regarded Illinois Brick as an
ordinary standing case and noted the remoteness of indirect purchasers, the
complexity of the damage calculation, and the presence of potential plain-
tiffs-the masons who purchased the concrete blocks directly from the manu-
facturers-who would be motivated to bring an action.149
Given that the Court did not fold Illinois Brick into a general antitrust
standing analysis, it left open a number of possible interpretations of Illinois
Brick. First, Illinois Brick could have simply stood for the definition of dam-
ages. Under this interpretation, Illinois Brick would have answered the ques-
tion, "what is the appropriate measure of damages in price-fixing cases?"'150
Measure is emphasized because the decision does not adopt actual harm as
the measure of damages, but adopts a surrogate-the full overcharge.
Second, Illinois Brick also could have been seen as a per se application
of AGC. As with its substantive antitrust law counterparts, it could have
been viewed as standing for the proposition that when a plaintiff is an indi-
rect purchaser, the step-by-step analysis of AGC can be dispensed with be-
cause indirect purchasers almost always will fail the standing test. This
appears to be the position that Illinois Brick now represents.
Third, as will be discussed in greater detail below, Illinois Brick could
have been interpreted in a way that would have assisted in rationalizing the
system of antitrust plaintiffs and deterrence. Under this interpretation, it is
not obvious that every indirect purchaser would be denied standing. For ex-
ample, in Illinois Brick itself, the Court concedes that some direct purchasers
145 See id. at 542. This issue could be put in terms of whether a violation would go unde-
tected should a specific plaintiff be denied standing.
146 See id. at 543-44. The Court cited Illinois Brick as supporting the last of these factors.
See id. at 545.
147 It may be important in this regard to distinguish between antitrust injury, which is now
part of an antitrust standing analysis, and being an indirect purchaser. Plaintiffs who fail the
standing test because they have not suffered an antitrust injury have not incurred the types of
harm that the antitrust laws were designed to prevent. Even if they have suffered antitrust injury
and have cleared the other hurdles as well, as indirect purchasers they are still disqualified.
148 See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 745 (1977).
149 It seems likely that indirect purchasers would satisfy the antitrust injury part of the test
as the overcharge eventually passed on to them, which is certainly the type of harm the antitrust
laws were designed to prevent.
150 At least one court has suggested that Illinois Brick-type plaintiffs may still be eligible for
a recovery if they recharacterize the offense as something other than price fixing. See In re
Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 606 (7th Cir. 1997).
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may not be motivated to bring an antitrust action against a supplier.151 In
addition, there are cases beyond those involving preexisting cost-plus con-
tracts in which the determination of the damages would not be unduly
complicated.
As with so much of the happenstance that seems to explain Illinois
Brick, the fact that it preceded McCready and AGC by a few years may have
been critical in its result. More directly, it is not clear that the application of
antitrust standing principles developed after Illinois Brick would have re-
sulted in what is essentially a per se approach to barring actions by indirect
purchasers. Instead, the Court may have opted for a case-by-case analysis
that applies the policies152 of AGC to each set of indirect purchasers. Indeed,
under standing doctrine, as opposed to Illinois Brick, the indirect purchasers
in Utilicorp may have fared differently. Moreover, as will be discussed be-
low, Illinois Brick, as applied, seems to block certain types of plaintiffs who
are not more remotely affected than other plaintiffs who do have standing.15-
D. Expanding and Contracting Illinois Brick
Even though it is, in effect, a per se standing rule, it is not clear how
broadly Illinois Brick is intended to apply. More specifically, can it block
actions by plaintiffs who, though indirectly affected, might pass muster under
conventional standing analysis? Also, can a plaintiff avoid Illinois Brick by
taking care not to characterize its claim as price fixing? Both the elasticity
and limitations of Illinois Brick have been demonstrated by five recent
cases.' 54 These cases inform us, depending on one's point of view, of the
potential dangers or promise of that opinion, and assist us in determining
what might be done to bring Illinois Brick into a more coherent model of
antitrust enforcement.
1. Lucas Automotive Engineering v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.
Perhaps the simplest expression of a possible extension of Illinois Brick
is found in Lucas Automotive Engineering, Inc. v. Bridgestone/Firestone,
Inc.,'55 in which a distributor of vintage automobile tires challenged the ac-
quisition by its competition of an exclusive license to manufacture Firestone
vintage tires.'56 The Ninth Circuit first applied an ordinary standing analysis,
as discussed above, and determined that the plaintiff did not have standing,
151 See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 746 (noting that purchasers might be concerned about
"disrupting relations with a supplier").
152 See supra discussion accompanying notes 67-91.
153 For a case that views AGC as controlling the application of Illinois Brick, see In re
Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litigation, 998 F.2d 1144, 1164 (3d Cir. 1993).
154 See Lucas Automotive Eng'g, Inc. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 140 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir.
1998); Campos v. "icketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166 (8th Cir. 1998); Sports Racing Servs., Inc. v.
Sport Car Club of America, Inc., 131 F.3d 874 (10th Cir. 1997); In re Brand Name Prescription
Drugs Litig., 123 F.3d 599 (7th Cir. 1997); In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998
F.2d 1144 (3d Cir. 1993).
155 140 F.3d at 1228.
156 See id. at 1231.
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as a competitor, to bring an action for damages on the basis of a possibly
illegal acquisition. 57
The plaintiff also argued that it was now in the position of a consumer
because it would have to purchase some brands of tires from the competing
distributor. 158 The court observed that, since the acquisition, the plaintiff had
not actually purchased tires from its rival, but had purchased them from a
supplier who had, in turn, used the defendant as its supplier. 59 In effect, the
plaintiff was an indirect purchaser. Noting that the fundamental basis for the
holding in Illinois Brick was to avoid the problem of apportioning
overcharges, 160 the court then held that the plaintiff could not bring an action
for damages resulting from the licensing agreement.161 In effect, the fact that
the substantive violation was not price fixing was of no consequence. On the
other hand, the fact that the plaintiff was indirectly affected did not bar an
action by the plaintiff as an indirect purchaser for injunctive relief in the form
of divestiture.162
2. In re Brand Name Prescription Drug Litigation
Lucas Automotive is somewhat difficult, but not impossible, to square
with the reasoning of Judge Posner in In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs
Antitrust Litigation63 ("BNPD"). In that case, retailers of brand name pre-
scription drugs claimed that manufacturers and wholesalers had conspired
with one another to deny retailers discounts available to favored customers,
including HMOs and mail order pharmacies.' 64 The trial court ruled that
there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that a conspiracy existed
between manufacturers and wholesalers, which meant that the wholesalers
were direct purchasers from the manufacturers and the retailers were indirect
purchasers.165 Despite this conclusion, however, the trial court went on to
hold that the retailers fit within the "control" exception to Illinois Brick 66
The Seventh Circuit reversed both holdings, finding sufficient evidence
for the plaintiffs to survive summary judgment on the issue of the existence
of a conspiracy. 67 Consequently, the exception to Illinois Brick, on which
the lower court had relied and which Judge Posner found unpersuasive, was
unnecessary. Beyond that, however, Judge Posner opined that even if it were
157 See id. at 1232-33. Specifically, the court reasoned that the plaintiff failed the "antitrust
injury" element of the standing analysis. See id. at 1233.
158 See id. at 1233.
159 See id.
160 See id. ("The indirect purchaser rule serves to avoid the complications of apportioning
overcharges between direct and indirect purchasers and to eliminate multiple recoveries.").
161 See id. at 1234.
162 See id. at 1234-35. As a competitor, however, the plaintiff did not have standing to bring
an action for divestiture.
163 123 F.3d 599 (7th Cir. 1997).
164 See id. at 602-03. In the class action, the retailers pursued this as a price-fixing claim for
damages. See id- Another theory was a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act, which would
have obviated the need for an Illinois Brick analysis. See id. at 604.
165 See id. at 604.
166 See id. at 605-06.
167 See id. at 616.
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found that the manufacturers and wholesalers had not conspired, Illinois
Brick might not bar a recovery:
We can imagine the present case reconfigured in a way that
might take it out of the orbit of [Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe]
.... A number of pharmacies have tried to improve their bargain-
ing position vis-a-vis the drug manufacturers by forming buying
groups . . . . The manufacturers have been steadfast in refusing to
grant discounts to such groups. If this refusal, taking as it does the
form of a refusal to enter into direct contractual relations with cer-
tain retailers, such as the manufacturers have with their favored cus-
tomers, were successfully challenged as a boycott the Illinois Brick
rule, which is a rule concerning overcharges, would fall away. The
plaintiffs would be permitted to prove up whatever damages they
could show had flowed from the boycott, provided they weren't
seeking to recover overcharges, for that would entail the very inci-
dence analysis that Illinois Brick bars.168
In many respects, Judge Posner's suggestion points out the inconsistency
of Illinois Brick. First, the plaintiffs would be required to rely on the boycott
theory only if they were found to be indirect purchasers. Then, presumably
they would be required to demonstrate not the overcharge, but evidently the
lost profits incurred due to the boycott. Because the refusal to grant dis-
counts was the basis of the claim and lost profits would have to flow from not
being granted these discounts, a logical requirement for calculating damages
would be to determine what the discounts would have been.169 In essence,
Judge Posner falls prey to the practical fallacy inherent in Illinois Brick;170 the
first step in determining the damages that Judge Posner suggests are available
requires the plaintiffs to conduct a basic overcharge analysis.
Moreover, Judge Posner does not say that reshaping the theory of liabil-
ity somehow transforms the plaintiffs into something other than indirect pur-
chasers.171 Judge Posner's language can be contrasted with that of Judge
O'Scannlain in Lucas Automotive. According to Judge O'Scannlain, "the
Supreme Court has held that an indirect or remote purchaser lacks standing
to seek damages relief against the manufacturer for alleged violations of fed-
eral antitrust laws."'1 72 In effect, Judge O'Scannlain seems to view Illinois
Brick as a standing opinion. Judge Posner, in contrast, seems to view the
application of Illinois Brick as connected specifically to one's theory of liabil-
ity and measure of damages. To grasp this inconsistency, one must consider
how the outcomes of the two cases might have been different had the circuits
168 Id. at 606 (internal citations omitted).
169 Estimating lost profits any other way would be very difficult because many variables
would have to be considered.
170 See discussion infra Section 4.B.
171 In the brand name prescription drug industry, manufacturers often negotiate directly
with indirect purchasers, who then purchase the drug from wholesalers. Wholesalers then get
"charge backs" from manufacturers for sales made at manufacturer negotiated prices. See
BNPD, 123 F.3d at 607.
172 See Lucas Automotive Eng'g, Inc. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 140 F.3d 1228, 1233
(9th Cir. 1998) (citing Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 728-29 (1977)).
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been reversed. On the one hand, Judge O'Scannlain may well have decided
that the drug retailers, were they determined to be indirect purchasers, did
not have standing. On the other hand, Judge Posner may have ruled that an
indirect purchaser who challenges a licensing agreement and can demon-
strate damages other than an overcharge may seek relief.
In terms of consistency with Illinois Brick, Judge O'Scannlain's position
seems to be the better reasoned of the two. Illinois Brick's central teaching is
that attempting to apportion overcharges must be avoided. 173 Any action by
an indirect purchaser is likely to begin with the question of what the price
would have been to the buyer in the absence of the violation and how much
of that overcharge was passed on to the plaintiff's customers.
Although Judge Scannlain's opinion may be more consistent with Illinois
Brick's underlying rationales, Judge Posner's opinion may be superior from a
policy standpoint. In BNPD, the direct purchasers had not pursued whatever
possible claims they might have had against the manufacturers, perhaps be-
cause their dependence on the manufacturers discouraged them from bring-
ing a private action. Indeed, one of the dangers recognized by the Illinois
Brick Court-a fear or lack of incentive on the part of direct purchasers to
bring an action-may have occurred.174 Thus, Judge Posner left open a possi-
ble avenue for private action by indirect purchasers.
3. Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp.
A third case that adds another dimension to both the dangers and the
potential of Illinois Brick is Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp.175 In Campos, a
proposed class of ticket purchasers sued Ticketmaster, a ticket distribution
service.176 Ticketmaster had long-term exclusive contracts with most concert
promoters. 7 7 As a consequence, a venue wishing to host an event typically
had to use Ticketmaster to distribute its tickets. This monopoly power, ac-
cording to the plaintiffs, permitted Ticketmaster to charge them excessive
amounts in the form of service charges. 78
The Eighth Circuit held that Illinois Brick barred the action by the ticket
purchasers. The court seemed to broaden Illinois Brick significantly by citing
it as standing for the proposition that "[a]n indirect purchaser is one who
bears some portion of a monopoly overcharge only by virtue of an antecedent
transaction between the monopolist and another, independent purchaser."'179
In Campos, the "antecedent transaction" was the initial contract between
Ticketmaster and the venue. Because this transaction determined from
whom the plaintiffs would purchase tickets, the plaintiffs were rendered indi-
rect purchasers. 80
173 See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 737.
174 See id. at 746.
175 140 F.3d 1166 (8th Cir. 1998).
176 See id. at 1168.
177 See id.
178 See id. at 1169.
179 Id. (emphasis added).
180 See id. at 1171. In other words, the monopolist (Ticketmaster) sold its services to the
direct purchaser (the venue) which then hosted the event for the indirect purchasers (the concert
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To reach this conclusion, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that the ticket
price and the service charge were both parts of an overall price of admis-
sion.' 81 Presumably, this price was set at a profit-maximizing level and, if
Ticketmaster or some other distributor were not involved, this price was the
price the venue itself would have charged. 82 In effect, the service charge was
a charge incurred-in the form of an allowance-by the venue itself for the
services of Ticketmaster. 83
The reasoning of the Eighth Circuit has some appeal from the stand-
point of economic theory, but it is not clear that the opinion is consistent with
Illinois Brick. Essentially, the court reasoned that there is a single profit-
maximizing price for the tickets, and the fact that the venue allowed another
party to capture a portion of that price meant that the party paying that spe-
cific portion was an indirect purchaser. 184 One problem with this theory is
that the price charged in the form of service fees by Ticketmaster may not be
the same as that charged by the venue if it sold the tickets directly. Specifi-
cally, the court does not seem to understand the problem of successive mo-
nopoly. The venue owner has some amount of market power that it can
exploit by raising ticket prices above competitive levels. Due to Tick-
etmaster's exclusive contracts with promoters, the venue must distribute its
tickets through Ticketmaster, creating a second layer of market power that
Ticketmaster can exploit by raising its fees for ticket distribution services.
The Campos plaintiffs complained about the noncompetitive price charged
by Ticketmaster for distribution services. As a result, these customers are
direct purchasers of the distribution service and would not fail an Illinois
Brick test.
Another problem with this decision is that it is not clear how broadly the
court's analysis extends. For example, according to the court, organizations
such as Ticketmaster "'compete to secure contracts with venues and event
promoters for the right to sell tickets."1 85 If one focuses on the notion of a
"right," the logical extension of the court's reasoning would seem to be that
anyone who makes purchases from a party who has bought marketing or
production rights from a third party is an indirect purchaser. In all instances,
the seller of the right could have combined the necessary inputs and sold
them for the profit-maximizing price. For example, suppose that a producer
licenses production technology from a licensor of intellectual property. In
principle, according to Campos, the producer's customers would be indirect
purchasers because the licensor could have produced the good and sold it
directly to those customers. This cannot make sense as a means of identify-
ing indirect purchasers.
goers). As an economic matter, this makes no sense because the class alleged overcharges on
Ticketmaster's services-not on the tickets. How licketmaster acquired the power to impose
overcharges on services ought to be irrelevant.
181 See id.
182 See id. at 1172.
183 See id.
184 See id.
185 Id. at 1171 (quoting Note, Beyond Economic Theory: A Model for Analyzing the Anti-
trust Implications of Exclusive Dealing Arrangements, 45 DuKE LJ. 1009, 1015 (1996)).
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Put more in terms of Illinois Brick, the issue becomes one of identifying
the apportionment problem that is the central concern of that case. In Cam-
pos, plaintiffs allege that, but for Ticketmaster's monopoly power, they would
have paid lower service charges.186 In other words, if distribution rights had
been shared among several firms, the plaintiffs would have paid less. The
issue is hardly one of apportionment, but is simply one of determining what
the price would have been in the absence of Ticketmaster's alleged violation.
The proper analysis for a standing determination, therefore, would be under
AGC, not Illinois Brick.87
4. In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litigation
Campos seems to contrast sharply with the Third Circuit's decision in In
re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litigation,88 which involved an action
by steel producers against railroads that allegedly had limited the develop-
ment of less expensive means of transporting ore. 8 9 In effect, because of the
railroads' control of off-loading equipment, the steel companies were limited
to the use of shippers that could use that equipment. The producers claimed
that, if the alternative means of transportation had been permitted to de-
velop, they would have paid less for transportation. 190 Clearly, actual and
potential providers of alternative means of transportation felt the direct im-
pact of the railroads' actions. The plaintiffs calculated the damages as the
difference between what they were paying for transportation to existing ship-
pers and what they would have paid had new technologies been permitted to
develop.' 9 '
The Third Circuit relied on AGC in finding that Illinois Brick was not a
bar to recovery.'92 The court conceded that the steel companies were "in a
sense, indirect purchasers,"' 9 3 and addressed whether its reasoning was in-
consistent with Illinois Brick. According to the court, the fact that plaintiffs
paid "overcharges" to third parties did not mean they were excluded under
Illinois Brick. Under its AGC analysis, the court focused on the fact that the
actions by the railroads had a direct impact on the steel customers.194 In fact,
the steel transport industry existed exclusively for the use of steel produ-
cers.195 The court also noted that the type of injury the plaintiffs sought to
avoid was the type the antitrust laws were designed to prevent.196 Finally, the
court addressed the problem of duplicative recovery by indicating that,
186 See id. at 1169.
187 The lower court had applied a standing analysis and held that plaintiffs did not have
standing even if they were direct purchasers. Arguably, this decision is incorrect. Clearly, plain-
tiffs suffered antitrust injury-price of service exceeded a "but for" price. In addition, they were
not "remote" victims, and the damage calculations were no more complex than many others.
188 998 F.2d 1144 (3d Cir. 1993).
189 See id. at 1152-53.
190 See id. at 1154.
191 See id.
192 See id. at 1171.
193 Id. at 1168.
194 See id.
195 See id.
196 See id.
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although the steel companies were asking for overcharge-type damages, the
vessel and dock companies (the direct victims) from whom they purchased
services and who were also plaintiffs were measuring damages in terms of lost
profits. 97
5. Sports Racing Services v. Sport Car Club of America, Inc.
One more case sheds additional light on the problems of interpreting
Illinois Brick. In Sports Racing Services v. Sport Car Club of America, Inc.198
("SRS"), one of the plaintiffs participated in sports car races organized and
sanctioned by the defendant. 99 The defendant also sold the only cars and
parts that were permitted to be used in the sanctioned races.200 The defend-
ant did not sell its cars and parts directly to participants, but through distribu-
tors.201 The plaintiff charged that the defendant was engaged in illegal
monopolization of the specified cars and parts markets and tying.202
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis with the statement that "[t]he
Supreme Court has consistently held that only direct purchasers suffer injury
within the meaning of § 4 of the Clayton Act. ' 203 The court then held that
the plaintiff lacked standing to bring a monopolization claim204 because it
was an indirect purchaser of the racing cars and parts.205 Under the tying
claim, the court identified the tying "product" as "racing services" and identi-
fied the tied product as the cars and parts that were required to compete in
the races.2°6 Even though the plaintiff was an indirect purchaser in the tied
product market the court ruled that the plaintiff did have standing.207 In
thinking about the court's conclusion, it is important to remember that the
monopolized market under the theory of monopolization was the same as the
tied product market in the tying claim. In other words, the alleged underly-
ing anticompetitive aim was the same-the exertion of market power in the
cars and parts market. Yet, standing hinged on neither the underlying com-
petitive harm nor the type of damages requested, but on the classification of
the violation.
In some respects, the Tenth Circuit's opinion is similar to Judge Posner's
in BNPD because characterization was the key even though the substance of
the defendant's actions was no different. Nevertheless, the opinion can be
distinguished from Judge Posner's because changing the way the offense was
197 See id. at 1169. The Third Circuit made an effort to explain Lower Lake Erie in McCar-
thy v. Recordex Service, Inc., 80 F.3d 842 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that even though hospital pa-
tients are "indirect purchasers," they have standing to seek injunctive relief against a copy
service with exclusive rights to photocopy patients' medical records).
198 131 F.3d 874 (10th Cir. 1997).
199 See id. at 878.
200 See id.
201 See id.
202 See id. at 879.
203 Id.
204 See id. The market subject to monopolization consisted of a specific type of racing car
and parts. See id.
205 See id. at 884.
206 See id. at 886-87.
207 See id. at 887.
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framed did not necessarily change the way the damages were calculated.208
Instead, the pivotal factor in SRS was the "label" placed on the violation.
Perhaps most interesting was the Tenth Circuit's own change in analyti-
cal approach. In the context of monopolization, the court adopted the per se
standing rule by reasoning that indirect purchasers do not have standing. 20 9
When reviewing the tying claim, however, it adopted a more pragmatic view.
The court reasoned that Illinois Brick could be interpreted as selecting the
"best" plaintiff between the direct and indirect purchaser. 210 In the case of
an indirect purchaser of a tied item, the court held that the direct purchaser
was merely a conduit and the "best" plaintiff was the indirect purchaser. 211
This approach, although invoking the authority of Illinois Brick, is in sub-
stance closer to a direct application of AGC because the analysis is devoted
to the relative merits of various potential plaintiffs.
E. Summary
The above analysis suggests that Illinois Brick is the odd culmination of
an extended effort to reduce the barriers to antitrust recoveries. Although
Illinois Brick may have dealt effectively with problems that existed when it
was decided, subsequent events have exposed numerous inconsistencies. The
most obvious inconsistency is that one of the pillars of Illinois Brick-avoid-
ance of multiple liability-was undermined by ARC America, which cleared
the way for indirect purchaser suits in state courts. Even this, however, un-
derstates the problem. Illinois Brick has not been undermined in a consistent
or uniform sense. Instead, the level of private antitrust enforcement depends
on the geographic location of the suit. One might argue that this is hardly the
problem of Illinois Brick itself. But the problem of differing levels of liability
that depend on geographic location can be traced to the premise of that opin-
ion. The primary issue faced by the Illinois Brick Court was how it should
deal with the offensive use of pass-on theories given that it had decided
against defensive uses of those theories in Hanover Shoe.212 The Court could
have overruled Hanover Shoe and permitted both offensive and defensive
use of the pass-on theory, or it could have narrowed Hanover Shoe to capital
goods.213 In either case, defensive use of the pass-on theory would have de-
creased the likelihood of multiple liability. Thus, although it most likely did
not conceive of the issue in these terms, the Illinois Brick Court opted for
simplicity in the federal courts at the expense of potentially exposing defend-
ants to multiple liability through state court actions.
The uncertainty that Illinois Brick now creates for defendants is dupli-
cated for plaintiffs in two complementary ways. The first deals with the level
208 Judge Posner suggested that the indirect purchasers could have used a different theory
of liability as long as they did not ultimately base damages on an overcharge theory. See In re
Brand Name Prescription Litigation, 123 F.3d 599, 606 (7th Cir. 1997). In SRS, however, the
damage calculation was not part of the court's analysis. See SRS, 131 F.3d at 890.
209 See SRS, 131 F.3d at 884.
210 See i& at 889.
211 See id.
212 See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 728 (1977).
213 See id. at 736.
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of enforcement and the second with the likelihood of compensation. First,
under current law, plaintiffs may fall under the general standing guidelines of
AGC or the specific standards of Illinois Brick. Illinois Brick is framed in
terms of indirect purchasers214 while AGC uses the notion of remoteness. 215
But the general concerns of both cases are the same with respect to finding
the plaintiff or plaintiffs who will aggressively enforce the antitrust laws for
the right reasons.216 In a number of cases involving price fixing, the plaintiffs
most likely to pursue an antitrust claim may be indirect purchasers who con-
ceivably could have standing under AGC, but are denied the opportunity to
recover as indirect purchasers under Illinois Brick. What this means is that
the level of private enforcement may vary depending on the type of antitrust
offense alleged. Ironically, a lower level of enforcement is likely to take
place when the practice-price fixing-is the most pernicious.
Second, from the perspective of compensating plaintiffs, Illinois Brick
creates a situation in which plaintiffs' recovery is not based on whether a firm
has violated antitrust laws or injured the plaintiffs, but on the nature of the
violation. But even this understates the artificiality of what separates those
who have standing and those who lack it. As BNPD and SRS illustrate,
standing may hinge merely on how the activity is characterized.2 17 In prac-
tice, this will result in strained efforts to pigeonhole business conduct to
evade the dictates of Illinois Brick.
A rational system of private enforcement would be one that does not
vary by the type of violation, jurisdiction, or the nature of the plaintiff. This
is not to suggest that it is possible to determine a single level of enforcement.
But three goals stand out. First, firms engaged in obviously anticompetitive
activity should face generally the same level of exposure. This is not the case
now. Take, for example, the case of price fixing by firms dealing with rela-
tively weak buyers. The risk of suit by the direct purchasers is low, and the
risk of suit by an indirect purchaser is nonexistent unless a state permits it.
Second, firms acting within the gray areas of antitrust law should be able to
draw some general conclusions of likely exposure. Finally, plaintiffs should
not be differentiated based on the type of violation lending to their injury or
the skill of their attorneys in pleading around the indirect purchaser problem.
III. Rationalizing Illinois Brick
Identifying the inconsistencies and uncertainty created by Illinois Brick
and subsequent decisions and statutes is a much easier undertaking than for-
mulating practical solutions. Nevertheless, this Article identifies three possi-
214 See id at 729.
215 See Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council, Inc., 459 U.S. 519,540
(1983) (considering the "chain of causation between the Union's injury and the alleged restraint
in the market for construction subcontracts").
216 See id. at 542; Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 746.
217 In BNPD, Judge Posner suggested that the plaintiffs could recharacterize their price-
fixing claim as a group boycott to circumvent Illinois Brick, see In re Brand Name Prescription
Litigation, 123 F.3d 599, 606 (7th Cir. 1997), while the court in SRS denied the monopolization
claim under Illinois Brick, but allowed the tying claim, see Sports Racing Servs., Inc. v. Sport Car
Club of America, Inc., 131 F.3d 874, 890 (10th Cir. 1997).
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ble solutions. The first would be to overturn both Hanover Shoe and Illinois
Brick and leave all issues of whether to recognize specific plaintiffs and par-
ticular types of damages to general standing requirements and the antitrust
injury doctrine. This approach would retain the overcharge measure of
damages.
A second possibility would be to allow all parties to recover their actual
damages. Typically, this would be in the form of lost profits, but in the case
of final users, including consumers, damages would continue to be the over-
charge' or a portion of it.218 The requirement that actual damages be shown
would seem to be responsive to the fear of multiple liability as expressed by
the Illinois Brick Court. It might also appear that this measure of damages
would avoid the difficult process of tracing a fixed overcharge through a
stream of purchasers. This is not the case, however, because most efforts to
determine the lost profits of an indirect purchaser will necessitate a determi-
nation of the extent to which the increased prices affected the indirect pur-
chaser. This simply means the Jost profit measure is no worse than the
overcharge measure on this score. At the same time, it is nevertheless a
more precise measure of damages.
The third possibility would be to narrow Illinois Brick so that it applies
only in suits for overcharge damages by indirect purchasers. This approach
would prevent extended applications of Illinois Brick, such as that found in
Campos, but would leave open the possibility that some indirect purchasers
might recast their theories of liability to overcome Illinois Brick. Although
this creates something of an inconsistency, the availability of more than one
theory to plaintiffs may simply be an unavoidable consequence of the fact
that antitrust violations can be characterized differently and courts will deter-
mine whether a plaintiff has been harmed depending on how the violation is
characterized.
A. Overturning Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe
The elimination of Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe would leave the
treatment of indirect purchasers to be determined under AGC and other
standing decisions. The chief advantage of such an approach is that it would
blunt the impact of ARC America. For example, defendants would be per-
mitted to use a pass-on theory to reduce damages to the extent that an over-
charge was passed on to indirect purchasers. Those defendants would remain
liable in federal courts to indirect purchasers who could satisfy the require-
ments of AGC. In addition, whether successfully employing a pass-on de-
fense or not, some defendants would remain liable to indirect purchasers in
states with Illinois Brick legislation2 19 Most importantly, defendants would
be far less vulnerable to different antitrust exposure depending on the geo-
graphic location of the offense.
218 Clearly, in cases of purchases by municipalities, the proper damages measure would still
be the overcharge.
219 Some indirect purchasers would have a choice of federal or state court just as antitrust
plaintiffs do, for the most part, today. They would not, however, be able to recover in both state
and federal court for the same damages.
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Overturning Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe would not, however, auto-
matically erase all inconsistencies. An indirect purchaser applying federal
law would be required to satisfy the standing requirements of AGC, but a
plaintiff relying on state legislation permitting indirect purchaser action
would likely have a lower burden. The significance of this possible discrep-
ancy would depend largely on the likelihood that courts would interpret
AGC as permitting actions by indirect purchasers. This is not a simple analy-
sis because AGC not only assumes that suits by indirect purchasers are pro-
hibited, it actually relies on Illinois Brick. Still, it does appear that many
indirect purchasers in price-fixing cases would pass the tests of AGC.
When examining indirect purchasers under the AGC analysis, two re-
lated factors stand out. First, as noted earlier, AGC adopts antitrust injury as
part of an overall standing analysis.220 Indirect purchasers almost certainly
would pass this portion of an AGC analysis.
Second, AGC is, as a factual matter, a complex case. The plaintiff was a
labor union claiming it was damaged by contractors who were coercing em-
ployers to hire only non-union labor.221 Because of this factual wrinkle, the
Court's reasoning supporting the necessity of limiting the scope of eligible
plaintiffs has a great deal of appeal. Specifically, the Court noted the diffi-
culty of determining whether or not the union was injured and whether or
not the market was rendered less competitive by the contractors' attempts to
discourage the use of union labor.=2 Moreover, the plaintiff made no allega-
tion "that output ha[d] been curtailed or prices enhanced." 223
In the context of indirect purchasers, no such complexity exists. Indirect
purchasers are made worse off by paying higher prices than they otherwise
would pay. Whether they are final users or resellers, the injury is one readily
recognized by the antitrust laws. Indeed, the majority of cases in which the
AGC test would be applied to indirect purchasers involves an offense-prices
fixing-that is unlawful per se. Thus, the proper perspective is one that re-
places the complicated facts of AGC with the simple facts of a standard indi-
rect purchaser case.
In this context, we can focus on the three most important factors recog-
nized by the AGC Court. First, the Court notes its concerns about the com-
plexity of attempting to apportion damages.22 4 Second, the Court describes
an interest in avoiding duplicative recoveries.225 Finally, the Court reasoned
that "[t]he existence of an identifiable class of persons whose self-interest
would normally motivate them to vindicate the public interest in antitrust
enforcement diminishes the justification for allowing a more remote party...
to perform the office of a private attorney general. ' 226 This last hurdle is the
most challenging for indirect purchasers.
220 See AGC, 459 U.S. at 544.
221 See id. at 520-21.
222 See id. at 539. According to the Court, "the Union was neither a consumer nor a com-
petitor in the market in which trade was restrained." Id.
223 Id. at 539 n.40.
224 See id. at 544-45.
- 225 See id at 543-44.
226 Id. at 542.
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1. The Complexity of Apportioning Damages
The significance of the difficulties associated with damage apportion-
ment can be greatly overdrawn. In fact, one wonders just how much actual
conviction lies behind the Court's position. First, the difficult part of the ap-
portioning process is determining the "but for" price for the indirect purchas-
ers. In other words, what price would these purchasers have paid "but for"
the price fixing? Although difficult at times, the process is far from impossi-
ble and, in many circumstances, plaintiffs are likely to be able to satisfy the
relatively relaxed standards for proving antitrust damages.227
To understand why, it is important to distinguish between proving dam-
ages and "apportioning." If a group of manufacturers were to fix prices on
goods sold to fabricators who sell to distributors who sell to retailers who sell
to consumers, estimating the amount passed on at each stage would be a
daunting task. An indirect purchaser, however, need not do this. An indirect
purchaser must estimate only the "but for" price that it should have paid,
which is a far less exacting exercise than apportioning the overcharge
throughout the entire chain of distribution.
To be sure, estimating the requisite "but for" price at the consumer
stage, in this example, would not be easy because a great number of factors
may affect that price.228 Still, any general fear of the difficulties indirect pur-
chasers may experience in calculating the "but for" price to determine the
overcharge can be overstated. A determination of a "but for" price already
is required in a great number of instances. For example, Judge Posner's opin-
ion in BNPD closes the door on indirect purchasers attempting to show over-
charge damages and opens the door to proof of lost profits.229 The problem
is that indirect purchasers almost certainly begin the process of calculating
lost profits with a determination of the price they would have been charged
"but for" the price fixing.
Not only is the determination of damages as much of a dilemma as the
AGC Court would suppose, but the Court itself has shown less concern with
the problem of complexity than its opinions in Illinois Brick and AGC sug-
gest. First, as a general matter, lost profits is the measure of damages in most
antitrust cases.230 The use of lost profits necessitates a determination of the
"but for" price whether the violation is tying, a group boycott, a refusal to
deal, or monopolization. In fact, the determination of a "but for" price by
indirect purchasers in price-fixing cases may be even simpler than in many
other instances because the violation itself directly affects price in an obvious
way. In the case of other violations, the impact on price is less obvious.
227 See supra text accompanying notes 22-66.
228 For an argument in favor of estimating overcharges for indirect purchasers, see Harris &
Sullivan, supra note 10; Elmer J. Schaefer, Passing-on Theory in Antitrust Treble Damage Ac-
tions: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 16 WM. & MARY L. Rnv. 883, 885-86 (1975).
229 See supra text accompanying notes 163-168.
230 For example, in all cases involving exclusion (or foreclosure), the damage is lost profit
on lost sales. This follows because the lost profits due to exclusion involve the following compu-
tation: price but for the exclusion times the quantity that would have been sold less the incre-
mental costs of making those sales.
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Second, and more specifically, the Supreme Court's concern about com-
plexity is, to some extent, belied by its actions in other instances. For exam-
ple, in . Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.,231 the Court considered
the application of so-called "automatic damages" in a Robinson-Patman Act
claim.23 2 Automatic damages would be the difference between what the dis-
favored firm paid for the goods and the price it would have paid in the ab-
sence of discrimination multiplied by the number of units purchased.23 3 The
Court rejected the use of an automatic overcharge in favor of lost profits.234
This lost profits measure, however, requires the disfavored firm to determine
the price it would have paid "but for" the discrimination.235 The firm then
must determine how much of this "overcharge" would have been passed on
to customers and how much the "overcharge" ultimately would impact
profit.23 6 It is difficult to square this assignment to plaintiffs in Robinson-
Patman Act cases with the Court's efforts to avoid complexity and apportion-
ment in AGC and Illinois Brick.237 More important, perhaps, is that the ulti-
mate decision of whether a specific damage calculation has become too
speculative would continue to lie within the purview of the trial court.23 8
Even under the relatively lax antitrust standards, a court can refuse to allow
the matter to proceed to the trier of fact if the damage calculations are
deemed speculative. 3 9
2. Avoiding Multiple Liability
The second of the three problems facing an indirect purchaser trying to
satisfy the standards of AGC is probably the easiest with which to dispense.
The Court initially announced its concern about multiple liability in Illinois
Brick. 40 In that context, a concern about multiple liability made a great deal
of sense because the Court already had ruled out the defensive use of pass-on
theories in Hanover Shoe.241 In short, the threat of multiple liability was a
real one given that the defendants could not off-set the amount by which
direct purchasers passed overcharges on to their buyers. By overruling both
Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe, the threat of multiple liability largely would
be eliminated.
231 451 U.S. 557 (1981).
232 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1994); see J. Truet Payne, 451 U.S. at 559-60. The case involved
secondary line price discrimination. Secondary line price discrimination involves injury to com-
petition between and among different customers of the discriminating firm.
233 See J. Truett Payne, 451 U.S. at 560.
234 See id. at 561-62.
235 See id. at 562.
236 See id. at 564-65.
237 The one consistent feature of these decisions-and several others of their era-is de-
creasing the level of private antitrust enforcement.
238 Damage calculations are speculative due to a failure of proof. See Blair & Page, supra
note 33, at 426.
239 See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 124 (1969); Bigelow v.
RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946).
240 See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 730 (1977).
241 See id. at 729.
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To some extent, however, the risk of multiple liability begs the issue.
The concept of "multiple liability" suggests some benchmark level of liability.
Yet, as indicated in the discussion above, lost profits and overcharges are
different measures of damages.242 In addition, the overcharge is not equal to
the plaintiffs losses nor the defendant's gain.24 3 Moreover, it is, at best, unu-
sual to argue against multiple liability when the statutory scheme requires
treble damages.
Finally, the threats of both allocative complexity and multiply liability
are overstated when one actually understands the full strategic implications
of overturning Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe. Without those cases, a de-
fendant would be permitted to demonstrate the amount that plaintiff had
passed on to indirect purchasers. By doing so, the defendant makes the suit
by indirect purchasers simpler because the evidence provided by the defend-
ant in the direct purchaser's action could be used by the plaintiff in the indi-
rect purchaser action. In such a scenario, there would appear to be a risk that
a defendant who fails to establish the existence of the pass-on in the direct
purchaser actions would be vulnerable to duplicative recovery by an indirect
purchaser.24 In this instance, however, the defendant will avoid duplicative
recovery because she will have the evidence offered by the plaintiff proving
that it did not pass the overcharge through to indirect purchasers. Finally, it
is possible as a procedural matter to join the various plaintiffs in order to
remove all possibility of multiple liability. This, of course, would be some-
what chaotic if there were a great number of indirect purchasers. 24 5
3. Allowing Potential Plaintiffs with More Direct Interests to Pursue the
Antitrust Claim
This leaves the question of how indirect purchasers would be affected by
the Court's admonition that the presence of potential plaintiffs who might be
more directly affected "diminishes" the justification for permitting more re-
motely affected parties to bring an action.246 The AGC Court's direction
here is not stated in absolute terms. Thus, the questions for indirect purchas-
ers may be how much the justification is diminished. It is difficult to consider
such a question in a vacuum. For practical purposes, however, the issue can
be addressed by asking whether indirect purchasers like those in Illinois
242 See infra text accompanying notes 269-274.
243 See supra note 48.
244 There is also a possibility of incomplete recovery. For example, suppose cement manu-
facturers collude on the price charged to ready-mix concrete companies. The ready-mix dealers
sue and recover a portion of the overcharge. The masonry contractor absorbs part of the over-
charge and also sues. The homeowner who buys the concrete sidewalk may be deemed too
remote and denied standing. In that case, the full overcharge will not be recovered. This, of
course, will weaken the deterrent effect of the private enforcement provision.
245 The device of interpleader would seem to be useful as a means of avoiding this problem.
This possibility is discussed by the Illinois Brick Court and rejected primarily due to practical
problems. See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 738 & n.19.
246 See Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council, Inc., 459 U.S. 519,542
(1983).
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Brick are more like the union in AGC or more like the plaintiff in Blue Shield
v. McCready,247 the Court's other major antitrust standing decision.
In McCready, the plaintiff's employer supplied medical insurance as part
of her compensation.248 By virtue of an agreement between Blue Cross and
the psychiatrists, the plan purchased by her employer did not provide cover-
age for psychotherapy offered by psychologists unless they were working
with a psychiatrist.249 The employee, McCready, claimed that the exclusion
of psychologists violated the Sherman Act 250 The Court held that McCready
had antitrust standing to pursue her claims.251
It is important to note that the direct purchaser in McCready was her
employer, or perhaps even Blue Cross.252 McCready, in effect, indirectly
"purchased" the insurance coverage by exchanging her labor for her em-
ployer's compensation package. This suggests that McCready stands for the
proposition that at least some indirect purchasers have antitrust standing.
In comparing the position of the plaintiff in McCready with that of the
union in AGC two factors stand out. First, as the Court correctly notes in
AGC, it is not clear whether and how the union's interests would be served
by greater competition in the market for labor .5 3 This factor, more than any
other, would seem to diminish the justification for permitting the union to
pursue its antitrust action. By comparison, McCready would benefit from
competition in the form of lower prices and higher quality services.
In addition, the "diminished justification" analysis of AGC can be read
as requiring a comparison of the remotely affected party with more directly
affected parties.25 4 In other words, the issue may be viewed in terms of each
party's relative aggressiveness in acting as a private attorney general. In this
context, one might ask how did McCready compare with other potential
plaintiffs in her case relative to how the union in AGC compared with other
potential plaintiffs in that case? In McCready, two other groups of possible
plaintiffs had an interest in pressing an antitrust claim.25 5 The first was psy-
chologists who were, in effect, the subject of a boycott by Blue Cross and the
psychiatrists. These psychologists would seem to be the most directly af-
fected group. The second was McCready's employer, who purchased the in-
surance tainted by anticompetitive action. The employer would have an
interest in getting the lowest price for the greatest array of services for its
payment. In AGC, on the other hand, the obvious alternative plaintiffs
247 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
248 See id. at 467-68.
249 See id. at 468.
250 See id. at 469-70.
251 See id. at 485.
252 To the extent that Blue Cross previously agreed on the reimbursements to be paid prov-
iders for various services, Blue Cross actually is buying the services for its subscribers.
253 See Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council, Inc., 459 U.S. 519,539
(1983).
254 See id. at 542.
255 A third possible group was Blue Cross, which may have found that the psychiatrists
demanded exclusivity to be included on the list of providers.
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would be contractors who would like to hire non-union labor without fear of
economic consequence. 25 6
This analysis suggests that McCready and the union were both indirectly
affected. The cases are different, however, with respect to the nature of this
indirect link. McCready received a "product," essentially passed on intact,
that had been affected by anticompetitive behavior, and the direct purchaser
may or may not have been more motivated to bring an antitrust action.25 7
The direct purchaser's motivation could well depend, as the Court has noted,
on the ability of the direct purchaser to pass the overcharge along and its
unwillingness to bring an action against suppliers it may have to depend on in
the future.25 8 On the other hand, the directly affected parties in AGC were
hardly simple conduits of a product. 25 9 Rather, it was these parties to whom
coercion was directly applied in order to affect their actions in the market.
This distinction between AGC and McCready suggests two points. First,
the remoteness issue in AGC is relatively obvious and, consequently, AGC is
not very helpful when it comes to the more borderline cases involving indi-
rect purchasers. Second, the cases together indicate that the difference be-
tween direct and indirect purchasers is a matter of degree while the
difference between an indirect purchaser and other indirectly affected parties
is a difference in kind. Comparing the relative levels motivating direct and
indirect purchasers to act as private attorneys general is an empirical ques-
tion that courts seem unlikely to be able to answer. Thus, under AGC and in
a judicial world without Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe, both direct and
indirect purchasers should be presumed to have standing.260 On the other
hand, standing decisions resting on differences in the kind of impact are the
sort courts are better able and expected to make.261
4. Benefits of Barring Some Indirect Purchaser Claims
This is not to suggest that all the arguments against barring indirect pur-
chaser actions are unimportant. No doubt, overturning Illinois Brick and
Hanover Shoe would result in more antitrust claims by indirectly affected
parties. 262 For example, suppose a manufacturer of building materials
purchases sand and sells some of it to toy manufacturers, who then package it
and sell it for use in sand boxes that are purchased by childcare centers.
Would the individual who makes use of and pays for the services of the child-
care center be permitted to bring an action if the producers of sand allegedly
were engaged in price fixing? Without Illinois Brick, there would not be a
256 See AGC, 459 U.S. at 541.
257 See Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 480 (1982).
258 Of course, what is passed on in McCready is a lower quality product, but this should not
alter the analysis.
259 See AGC, 459 U.S. at 539.
260 Remotely affected indirect purchasers, as explained below, may fail the AGC test.
261 There would continue to be, however, difficult standing decisions in a great variety of
other cases.
262 One should not overstate the increase, however, because a number of states already
permit indirect purchaser actions.
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"bright line" answer to this. Nevertheless, under the analysis of AGC, it is a
virtual certainty that the parents would not have antitrust standing.
The increase in antitrust claims, in general, may not be as great as one
would initially expect. Several states already permit actions by indirect pur-
chasers.263 In addition, as matters now stand, a plaintiff or class of indirect
plaintiffs may have to bring an action in several different states. With indi-
rect purchaser access to federal courts, there could be a single action. If all
the relevant parties could be joined in a single action, the costs of litigation
actually might decrease. In addition, by allowing indirect purchasers access
to federal courts, antitrust would regain some of the enforcement lost when
ARC America was decided.
B. Lost Profits as a Uniform Measure of Damages
1. Lost Profits and the Overcharge Measure of Damages
Overruling Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick would not only allow indi-
rect purchasers to recover the portion of the illegal overcharge that is passed
on, it also would make it more likely that all plaintiffs could recover actual
damages. Allowing injured parties to collect actual damages is consistent
with the language of the Clayton Act, which makes a remedy available to
"any person who shall be injured in his business or property" and sets that
remedy at "threefold the damages by him sustained. 2 64 For consumers, the
damages sustained would be the difference between the price actually paid
and the price that would have been paid "but for" the conspiracy. It does not
matter whether these consumers were direct or indirect purchasers; their
damages would be captured by the overcharge that they experienced.2 65
Businesses, however, make purchases to produce goods and services that
are subsequently resold. As a result, these firms may pass on some or all of
the overcharge. Consequently, the damages sustained are captured appropri-
ately by their lost profits.266 Part of the appeal of the lost profits measure of
damages is supplied by the Clayton Act, which provides a right of recovery to
"any person who shall be injured in his business or property. '267 Injury to a
business results in reduced profits. Part of the appeal also stems from the
fact that the overcharge as a measure of damages is not precisely the same as
the lost profit. Moreover, the overcharge does not even deviate from actual
damages in any predictable direction or by any consistent amount.
The explanation is actually rather simple. Consider what happens to
competitive firms that are overcharged by a price-fixing cartel. Suppose that
each unit of the firms' competitively produced output requires one unit of the
cartel's input. The collusive increase in the price of that input will cause the
263 For an excellent analysis of state indirect purchaser suits, see Page, supra note 113.
264 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1994).
265 In most circumstances, there are welfare losses-that is, damages-suffered by consum-
ers who are priced out of the market. These damages would be extraordinarily difficult to mea-
sure and typically are not cognizable. See ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN,
ANTrIRusT ECONOMIcS 78 (1985).
266 For an analysis of lost profits, see Harrison, supra note 38.
267 15 U.S.C. § 15(a).
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firms' cost of production per unit to increase by the amount of the over-
charge.268 The effect of the overcharge on the victims' profits will depend
upon what happens to the output price, which is governed by supply and
demand conditions.
At one extreme, suppose that demand is perfectly elastic, meaning that
any effort to raise price will be futile. The affected firms will find it optimal
to reduce their output. As a consequence, not only will these firms be paying
more for the input, but as their output decreases, they likely will produce that
output in an inefficient manner. More technically, the cost increase is com-
pounded by the unexploited economies of scale that result in the short run.
As a result, the lost profits will exceed the overcharge.269 In this instance, the
overcharge undercompensates the victim.
At the other extreme, suppose that demand is perfectly inelastic. In
other words, buyers do not respond to price increases. Consequently, the
competitive price of the victims' output will rise by the full amount of the
overcharge. The firms will continue to produce the original output without
losing any profit. In effect, there is no injury, and the damages sustained are
zero. The overcharge clearly overstates the lost profits because there were
no lost profits. The victims continue to earn a competitive return on their
investment.270 In this instance, the overcharge overcompensates the
"victim."
268 More technically, both average cost and marginal cost will increase by the amount of
the overcharge.
269 These results are easy to demonstrate. In Figure 1, the competitive firm initially had
average and marginal cost curves of AC, and MCI, respectively. At a competitive price of P1, the
firm maximized its profit by producing where price was equal to marginal cost, i.e., at a quantity
of Q1. As Figure 1 reveals, the competitive firm sold Q, at the competitive price and earned a
competitive return in doing so. Although price equals average cost at Q, and the firm's profits
are zero, the firm still earns a competitive return on its investment because that is part of the
cost. In other words, the average cost curve has embedded within it a competitive return. The
influence of the cartel overcharge is to shift the average and marginal cost curves from AC and
MCI to AC2 and MC2, respectively. If the price does not rise at all, the competitive firm in Figure
2 will respond to the higher cost of producing that quantity where MC2 equals P1, i.e., it will
produce Q2. Now, the firm's lost profit will be equal to the loss that it experiences, which equals
(AC2 - PI)Q2. The overcharge, however, is equal to the increase in average cost times the quan-
tity purchased, which equals (AC2 - AC,)Q2. One can see by inspecting Figure 1 that the lost
profit exceeds the overcharge, which is what we claimed in the text.
Pad-,cmt Figure 1
AC,
A,
C.
AC.
AC,
P.
0 0. 0. OQ..Uty
270 These results are also relatively easy to show. Figure 2 is precisely the same as Figuie 1
except that price has now risen to P2. Consequently, the competitive firm will continue to pro-
duce Q, because the new marginal cost (MC2) equals the new price (P2) at a quantity of Q,. In
this case, the overcharge equals the difference between AC and AC2 times the quantity, which
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We have analyzed the polar cases. If demand is perfectly elastic, price
does not rise and lost profits clearly exceed the overcharge. If demand is
perfectly inelastic, price rises by the full amount of the overcharge, but prof-
its are unaffected. The overcharge measure of damages is inadequate in one
case while it is excessive in the other. Admittedly, demand is not apt to be
perfectly elastic or perfectly inelastic, but the fact remains that the over-
charge measure is an inexact proxy for the actual damages, which are the lost
profits.271 This analysis suggests that much of the judicial hand wringing
about multiple liability and the allocation problem is misplaced. After all,
the measure of damage adopted-the overcharge-was never equal to the
damages suffered by most victims, nor, as illustrated earlier, was it even equal
to the ill-gotten gains of the price fixers.272
2. Problems in Estimating Lost Profit
A complete examination of the difficulties in estimating lost profits will
take us too far afield, but a few observations are in order. First, one must
recognize that lost profits are equal to the difference between the profits ac-
tually earned and the profits that would have been earned "but for" the anti-
trust violation. Because one must estimate what might have been, an
inevitable imprecision accompanies this exercise. The Supreme Court has
expressed a tolerance for this imprecision: "[I]t will be enough if the evi-
dence shows the extent of the damages as a matter of just and reasonable
inference." 273 The inevitable uncertainty associated with estimation and in-
ference has been recognized for well over half a century: "[t]he rule which
precludes the recovery of uncertain damages applies to such as are not the
certain result of the wrong, not to those damages which are definitely attribu-
table to the wrong and only uncertain in respect of their amount."274 In other
words, the plaintiffs burden is to "make a just and reasonable estimate of the
damage based on relevant data."275
equals (AC2 -AC) Qi. But there is no lost profit because the new price fully covers the increased
costs. All of the overcharge was passed on to the customers of the overcharged producers.
Pri and Cost Figure 2
P.
0I
271 If demand is highly elastic, we will observe results similar to those in Figure 1. If de-
mand is highly inelastic, we will get results similar to those in Figure 2. It is highly improbable
that the demand elasticity will be such that the overcharge will precisely equal the lost profit.
272 See supra note 48.
273 Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931).
274 Id. at 562.
275 Bigelow v. RICO Radio Picture, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946).
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Second, a reasonable inference differs from mere speculation. Admissi-
ble damage estimates must be more than a stab in the dark. Damage esti-
mates will be deemed insufficient as a matter of law, and therefore
inadmissible, if are a product of mere speculation and guesswork.27 6 Because
juries cannot be asked to speculate, insufficient damage evidence cannot be
put before the jury.277
One also should recognize that these difficulties of estimating lost profits
are no worse than those associated with estimating an overcharge. For the
latter, one must establish the price actually paid, which is usually available
from normal business records. This actual price is compared to the price that
would have been paid "but for" the price fixing. The "but for" price is the
price that unimpeded forces of supply and demand would have produced.
Consequently, one must control for a variety of economic and demographic
factors that influence supply and demand. This effort is not apt to be com-
pletely successful and, therefore, some degree of imprecision will infect the
estimation of the "but for" price.
3. Avoiding the Speculative Label
To avoid having a damage estimate characterized as speculative, certain
steps must be taken. For one thing, a plaintiff claiming lost profits during the
damage period should have a history of profitable operations in the past. In
estimating what the profits would have been "but for" the antitrust violation,
the plaintiff must consider other factors that would have influenced the prof-
its during the damage period. Some factors-growth, enhanced efficiencies,
reduction in competition-may have caused profits to rise, while other fac-
tors-increased costs, increased competition, regulatory changes-may have
caused profits to fall. Accounting for every potential influence may not be
possible, but the most important components should be examined.278
4. Lost Profits and Deterrence
The most glaring weakness of relying on lost profits as the appropriate
measure of damages is the reduced deterrent effect that may result. Take, for
example, the recent litigation concerning the lysine cartel. Lysine is essential
to animal nutrition and is used as an additive in animal feed.279 Archer Dan-
iels Midland and other producers fixed the price of lysine, thereby overcharg-
ing feed suppliers.280 The overcharged direct buyer clearly would have
standing to sue for the lost profits that resulted. The price of the feed to the
farmer would reflect the higher cost of the lysine, thereby reducing the
farmer's profits. In principle, these losses should be recoverable, but in prac-
276 See Home Placement Servs., Inc. v. Providence Journal Co., 819 F.2d 1199, 1205 (1st
Cir. 1987) (finding that lost profit damages are inappropriate where the plaintiff has introduced
no evidence tending to establish comparability between its own business and other companies
engaged in similar business pursuits).
277 See id. at 1208-09 (explaining that triers of fact must have sufficient evidence to make
reasonable inferences, and may not speculate on appropriate damage awards).
278 For an extended examination of speculative damages, see Blair & Page, supra note 33.
279 See United States v. Andreas, 39 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1054 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
280 See id.
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tice, such recovery may be problematic due to issues of standing. Presuma-
bly, the price of the animals will be higher due to the higher feed price, which
was due to the higher lysine price. These higher prices will reduce the profits
of the meat packer. Again, these losses should be recoverable in principle,
but are problematic in practice. Similar fates await the distributor, the re-
tailer, and finally the consumer.281 To the extent that standing rules preclude
recovery by some of those who have suffered lost profits, compensation will
be inadequate and the deterrent effect of section 4 of the Clayton Act will be
reduced.
C. Refining Illinois Brick
The most modest of the three proposals is to retain Illinois Brick, but to
refine it in a way that would permit consistent interpretations.282 The prob-
lem now is that Illinois Brick interpretations have shifted from time to time,
making it difficult to identify a single underlying principle.28 3 The principle
tension seems to be whether Illinois Brick is mainly about avoiding the com-
plexity of damage claims based on an overcharge or is to be regarded as a per
se application of AGC by barring claims by indirect purchasers. 28 4 The cases
discussed earlier-Lucas Automotive, BNPD, Campos, Lower Lake Erie,
and SRS2 5-are indicative of the problems of applying Illinois Brick in a
consistent fashion. In Lucas Automotive, the Ninth Circuit seemed to per-
ceive Illinois Brick as ultimately a standing decision.28 6 According to that
court, "an indirect purchaser. . lacks standing."28 7 In other words, indirect
purchasers are too remote (a standing concept) to recover under the antitrust
laws. In BNPD, however, Judge Posner seemed to interpret Illinois Brick as
driven primarily by concerns about damage apportionment, suggesting that
the plaintiffs reframe their theory of liability to avoid relying on an over-
281 The problem is even more complicated when restaurants buy the meat and prepare it
for consumers.
282 Obviously, in light of ARC America, complete consistency is impossible.
283 One area in which there is relative clarity concerns actions for injunctive relief. Illinois
Brick and its predecessor, Hanover Shoe, concerned actions for damages related to an over-
charge. This left open the question of whether Illinois Brick applies to indirect purchasers who
ask for injunctive relief in overcharge cases. The answer to this question has generally been no,
see, e.g., Campos v. Tlicketmaster, 140 F.3d 1166 (8th Cir. 1998); Labrador, Inc. v. IAMS Co., 105
F.3d 665 (9th Cir. 1996); Mid-West Paper Prods. Co. v. Continental Group, 596 F.2d 573 (3d Cir.
1979), which makes a great deal of sense if one views Illinois Brick strictly from a pragmatic
point of view. A court's decision concerning injunctive relief does not raise the issues of multiple
liability or damage apportionment. In these instances, Illinois Brick clearly stands for a rule
concerning the remedy sought. If courts had adopted the view that indirect purchasers lack
standing, even injunctive relief would be ruled out. It seems possible, in theory, that an indirect
purchaser asking for injunctive relief could satisfy Illinois Brick and still not satisfy the require-
ments of AGC. For example, although there is no apportionment problem, one might apply the
"diminished justification" rationale of AGC as a means of barring an indirect purchaser's action
for an injunction.
284 See supra text accompanying notes 154-207.
285 See supra text accompanying notes 155-211.
286 See supra text accompanying notes 155-162.
287 Lucas Automotive Eng'g, Inc. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 140 F.3d 1228, 1233 (9th
Cir. 1998).
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charge measure of damages.28 8 In fact, both BNPD and SRS suggest that a
plaintiff's right to relief hinges more on the plaintiff's proper labeling of the
defendant's conduct than it does on the defendant's conduct, the competitive
impact of that conduct, or the injury to the plaintiff.8 9
Campos shares some features with both Lucas Automotive and BNPD.
As in Lucas, the analysis of the Eighth Circuit in Campos centers around the
positioning or remoteness of the plaintiff vis-a-vis the defendant.290 Accord-
ingly, the plaintiff had been affected by an "antecedent transaction." 291 Evi-
dently, this is something different than an actual sale and subsequent resale
of an item-thus, an issue of remoteness, albeit somewhat vaguer than that in
Lucas Automotive. On the other hand, because the damages claimed were
part of what the court viewed as a monopoly overcharge, elements of BNPD
are present as well. Finally, the Third Circuit in Lower Lake Erie premised
its holding on the observation that "[a]lthough [defendant] suggests that indi-
rect purchaser status is the death knell of plaintiff's claim, this conclusion is
not supported by the current law.'' 292 It then proceeded to decide the Illinois
Brick issue on the basis of what was essentially an AGC analysis.293
The point to be stressed here is not that these opinions are internally
inconsistent,294 nor that the outcomes, considered individually, are necessar-
ily poor ones. Instead, the point is that a general rule of what Illinois Brick
stands for, which can be applied in a sensible way from case to case, is lack-
ing. This is not to say that it is a simple matter to determine an ideal applica-
tion of Illinois Brick. In fact, there is probably no consensus on what single
interpretation of Illinois Brick would yield an optimal level of antitrust en-
forcement. Instead, as with so many issues in law, the challenge is to find an
application that minimizes ambiguities and the potential for inconsistencies.
Thus, the best interpretation of Illinois Brick simply may be one that is the
least susceptible to misinterpretation by lower courts.295 A firm, albeit im-
perfect, rule that is subject to limited interpretation is likely to be an impor-
tant step in the evolution of a more rational system of enforcement. Just as
clear property rules facilitate mutually advantageous exchanges, clear legal
rules make for focused and rational judicial decision-making. The possibili-,
ties range from a very broad application of Illinois Brick to a very narrow
one. For reasons set out below, the narrowest application may hold the
greatest potential for consistency from plaintiff to plaintiff and court to court.
288 See In re Brand Name Prescription Litigation, 123 F.3d 599, 606 (7th Cir. 1997).
289 See id.; Sports Racing Servs., Inc. v. Sports Car Club of Am., Inc., 131 F.3d 874, 890
(10th Cir. 1997).
290 See Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166, 1169-71 (8th Cir. 1998).
291 Id. at 1169.
292 In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144, 1168 (3d Cir. 1993).
293 See id. at 1164-71.
294 Although to some extent they are.
295 One possibility that is related to the proposal discussed in the previous section is to
interpret Illinois Brick as prohibiting indirect purchasers from asking for damages equal to a
passed-on overcharge. This proposal results in the desired consistency, however, only if both
direct and indirect purchasers are limited to lost profits. Otherwise, there is a possibility of
multiple liability. As noted earlier, the passed-on overcharge would still be in order for
consumers.
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1. A Broad Application of Illinois Brick
A broad and relatively simple application of Illinois Brick would bar all
suits by all indirect purchasers. In other words, indirect purchasers would be
eliminated regardless of how those purchasers framed their complaints. This
interpretation is consistent with the view that Illinois Brick identifies a sub-
class of victims who automatically fail the test of AGC. Such a rule, broadly
applied, would eliminate plaintiffs similar to the plaintiff in SRS, who had
indirectly purchased a tied item.296 The rule also would eliminate plaintiffs
such as those in Lower Lake Erie, who claimed the railroads inhibited the
development of cheaper means of transporting ore.297 More importantly, the
plaintiffs, such as those in BNPD, would not be able to bring their action in
any form once they were identified as indirect purchasers. 298 Finally, hold-
ings like that in Campos and Lucas would likely stand.299
The complete elimination of indirect purchasers holds some promise for
consistent results because it would eliminate the ability of some plaintiffs to
recharacterize their actions to avoid Illinois Brick.300 In addition, one can
argue that, when an indirect purchaser is involved, there is by definition an-
other more directly affected plaintiff who could pursue the antitrust claim.
Although such an approach may provide something of a "bright line," there
are limitations. For example, as Campos illustrates, it is not always a simple
matter to determine when a purchaser is indirect or when the purchaser is
remotely affected.301 This may lead to inconsistent results between similarly
remote plaintiffs. A comparison of the plaintiff in McCready with the pur-
chasers in Illinois Brick makes this clear.302 Thus, a general rule barring indi-
rect purchasers is not a rule that treats similarly remote victims alike, but one
that discriminates among remote purchasers on the basis of the formalistic
nature of a relationship that, in and of itself, has no substantive antitrust
importance.
In addition, a broader application of Illinois Brick would increase one of
the dangers that the Court recognized when it decided that case-direct pur-
chasers may not be highly motivated to bring an antitrust action against an
important supplier.303 SRS probably represents a good example of this, as
does BNPD.304 This problem could be mitigated to some extent by a fuller
development of the "control" exception of Illinois Brick.305
296 See supra text accompanying notes 198-211.
297 See supra text accompanying notes 188-197.
298 See supra text accompanying notes 163-174.
299 See supra text accompanying notes 155-162, 175-187.
300 See, e.g., In re Brand Name Prescription Litigation, 123 F.3d 599 (7th Cir. 1997).
301 See supra text accompanying notes 155-162.
302 See discussion supra notes 247-263.
303 See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 745 (1977).
304 In BNPD, the direct purchasers were wholesalers that acted primarily as conduits for
the major drug producers. See BNPD, 123 F.3d at 603.
305 See discussion supra note 81.
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2. Middle Ground Application of Illinois Brick
A middle position would be one based on a rigid interpretation of Illi-
nois Brick that includes a set of clearly defined exceptions beyond the cost-
plus and "control" exceptions.3 0 6 For example, one such exception would
permit SRS-type plaintiffs-indirect purchasers from a firm engaged in ty-
ing-to bring an action.3 07 The rationale would be that the direct purchaser
is only a conduit and that the supplier is actually applying coercion to the
indirect purchaser, not the direct purchaser. In addition, absent the threat of
action by the indirect purchaser, the only potential plaintiffs would be the
foreclosed sellers of the tied good.
In a sense, though, this exception provides insight into the difficulty of
creating exceptions and addressing the questions that the exceptions raise.
For example, the universal rule would eliminate plaintiffs who claim to be
indirectly affected by monopolization or attempts to monopolize. 30 8 Two in-
consistencies stand out. First, monopolization and attempts to monopolize
claims often rely on variations on the leverage theory underlying tying
claims.30 9 Thus, a rigid application of the exception would mean that a firm
requiring resellers to carry its brand exclusively would not be answerable to
the customers who purchase from the coerced resellers. Second, it is far from
obvious that direct purchasers from firms engaged in monopolizing efforts
are uniformly more inclined to bring antitrust actions against their suppliers
than indirect victims of price fixing or tying. In short, an exception for those
indirectly affected by tying lacks substantive integrity because it distinguishes
plaintiffs on the basis of form only.
3. A Narrow Application of Illinois Brick
A final approach, and the one that may be the least imperfect, is to nar-
row Illinois Brick strictly to its facts. Thus, Illinois Brick would come into
play only when (1) the plaintiffs are indirect purchasers, (2) a product actu-
ally passes through a direct purchaser to the indirect purchaser, and (3) the
offense is price fixing. All other plaintiffs would be required to clear the
hurdles of AGC. This relatively objective checklist would mean that the mis-
chief resulting from Illinois Brick would largely be eliminated. Courts, plain-
306 Even those plaintiffs qualifying for an exception would have to pass the AGC tests to
have antitrust standing. An issue left open would be whether a purchaser from the direct victim
of a tying arrangement would fit within the exception. For example, a buyer of shoes from a
shoemaker who is a direct victim of at tying arrangement may pay more than he or she would in
the absence of tying. Whether or not Illinois Brick would bar this type of plaintiff is irrelevant
because the suit almost certainly would be barred by AGC.
307 A possible way to this outcome would be to apply the "control" exception of Illinois
Brick to instances in which the direct purchaser is simply a conduit for the tied product.
308 Interestingly, Hanover Shoe, the case leading to Illinois Brick, dealt with monopoliza-
tion, many aspects of which involved the use of leverage.
309 Monopolization and tying both rely on the "use" of market power. Compare United
States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 106-07 (1948) (concluding that the use of monopoly power, even
if lawfully acquired, in unfair competitive practices, is unlawful), with Jefferson Parish Hosp.
Dist. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (explaining that the existence of tied products requires an exam-
ination of how its use affects the markets and is not per se illegal).
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tiffs, and defendants would devote far fewer resources to the question of
whether Illinois Brick applies in particular instances.
Admittedly, this solution is subject to many of the same criticisms as the
previous suggestions. For example, it is arbitrary in that policies underlying
Illinois Brick would support limiting suits by plaintiffs beyond the indirect
purchasers identified here. In addition, thisrnarrow application would do lit-
tle to resolve the inconsistency between those indirect purchasers who can
reframe their claims as a boycott and those who can not. Although this in-
consistency can be limited by the proper application of the more general
standing requirements of AGC, such a limitation would not fully address the
problem. Still, as imperfect it as it is, a firm Illinois Brick rule would allow
litigants to focus on a narrow scope of issues and would permit the evolution
of a more rational system of antitrust enforcement.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court's decision in Illinois Brick is obsolete. It was neces-
sary when it was decided because of the development of the overcharge mea-
sure of damages in private antitrust actions and the Court's decision in
Hanover Shoe. Unfortunately, whatever rationalizing effect Illinois Brick
had was quickly and severely undercut by ARC America. In addition, almost
immediately after Illinois Brick, the Supreme Court began to develop more
general guidelines that address the broader Illinois Brick problem-what pri-
vate parties have standing to enforce the antitrust laws. Had this later devel-
opment come before Illinois Brick, it is questionable whether Illinois Brick
would have been necessary. Even if the Illinois Brick issue had been ad-
dressed under the antitrust standards developed in McCready and AGC, it is
not clear that a per se rule blocking suits by indirect purchasers would have
developed. Instead, issues of remoteness, multiple liability, and damage cal-
culation could have been assessed on a case-by-case basis.
Today, Illinois Brick and more general standards for antitrust standing
operate simultaneously, resulting in a derationalization of the system of pri-
vate enforcement. The ability of a plaintiff to bring a claim can turn on the
way the plaintiff frames her complaint. It also can turn on whether the plain-
tiff is viewed as being indirectly affected (an Illinois Brick term) or remotely
affected (an AGC term). Finally, a plaintiff's ability to sue can depend on
how broadly or narrowly a court chooses to interpret what it means to be an
"indirect" purchaser.
This Article has offered a number of solutions to this inconsistency.
First, both Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe could be overturned and the issue
of indirect purchaser standing assessed under general antitrust standing
guidelines. Second, if actual damages were adopted as the routine measure
of recovery in antitrust cases, not only would recoveries be more in line with
actual damages, but some of the issues Illinois Brick sought to address would
become less important. Finally, Illinois Brick could be retained, but clarified
in such a way that inconsistencies from circuit to circuit would be reduced.
We cannot report that any one of these proposals will fully rationalize
the system of private enforcement. Part of the problem is that the Supreme
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Court in ARC America has held that states may, in effect, maintain their own
antitrust regimes. These statutory schemes vary from state to state, and when
combined with federal antitrust law, they make for what amounts to a broad
spectrum of antitrust law that varies by jurisdiction. Thus, no single action by
the Supreme Court is capable of achieving consistency. There is, however,
utility in creating consistency at least with respect to what the federal law
says about private enforcement of those laws. Any of the proposals would
seem to further that end.
